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TREATIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT
CURTIS A.  BRADLEYt &JACK L. GOLDSMITHtt
INTRODUCTION
Article  II of the  Constitution  grants the President  the "Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro-
vided  two thirds  of the  Senators  present concur."'  When  the Presi-
dent obtains the Senate's advice and consent and ratifies a treaty, the
treaty binds  the United  States  internationally.  If the  treaty  is  "self-
executing," '  it also becomes part of domestic federal  law, superseding
t  Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
tt Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
For their helpful  comments and suggestions, we  thank David  Bederman,  Kathryn
Bradley, David Fidler, Ryan Goodman, John Manning, David Martin, Bernard Meltzer,
Madeline Morris, John Nagle, Caleb Nelson, Art Rynearson, John Setear, David Sloss,
Peter  Spiro,  Paul  Stephan,  David  Strauss,  Carlos  VWzquez,  Adrian  Vermeule,  Phil
Weiser, and participants in workshops held at the University of Chicago, University of
Notre Dame, University of Texas, and University of Virginia law schools.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2  By "self-executing,"  we  mean enforceable  in  U.S.  courts without implementing
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both prior inconsistent federal  law  (treaties  and  statutes)  and  prior
inconsistent state law.3
The constitutional  treatymaking  process was designed with a par-
ticular type of treaty in mind.  In the late eighteenth century, treaties
were  primarily bilateral  agreements  that focused  on relations  between
nations,  regarding  such issues  as trade and peace.  Nations entered
into  reciprocal  relationships  with  other  nations  to  achieve  mutual
gain.  By contrast, many modem treaties do not regulate relations be-
tween  nations  and do not confer specific  reciprocal  benefits on  the
parties.  Instead, they  are multilateral  instruments,  open for ratifica-
tion by all nations and designed to regulate the intra-national relations
between  nations  and  their  citizens.  This  distinction  is  most  pro-
nounced with respect to human rights treaties.
Modern  human rights  treaties present several  challenges  for the
U.S.  constitutional  system.  The  first  challenge  concerns  substance.
Human  rights  treaty provisions are  sometimes in  tension with either
constitutionally guaranteed rights  (like the First Amendment)  or well
settled and democratically popular  practices  (such  as  capital  punish-
ment for  heinous  crimes).  The  second  challenge  concerns  scope.
Human rights treaties touch on almost every  aspect of domestic  civil,
political,  and cultural life.  In addition, the language of these treaties
is often vague and open-ended.  If such treaties had the status of self-
executing federal law, they would  generate significant litigation  and
uncertainty  regarding the  application  and  validity  of numerous  do-
mestic  laws.  The  third challenge  concerns  structure.  Constitutional
principles  relating to separation  of powers suggest that domestic  fed-
eral law with respect to human rights should be made through  a law-
making process that involves the House of Representatives.  Similarly,
constitutional principles relating to federalism suggest that some mat-
ters should be regulated by state, rather than federal, officials.
For many years,  these challenges led U.S. treatymakers to decline
to  ratify  any  of the  major post-World  War  II  human  rights  treaties.
Beginning in the 1970s, the treatymakers  crafted a way to commit the
legislation.  See,  e.g.,  Foster v. Neilson,  27 U.S.  (2 Pet.) 253, 314  (1829)  (distinguishing
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties).
3 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that treaties "shall be the su-
preme  Law of the Land" and that the "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The  Supreme  Court has long held that treaties  supersede
inconsistent state law.  See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.  (3 Dall.)  199, 236-37 (1796).  It
also  has held that when there  is  a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, the
later in time prevails as a matter of U.S. law.  See,  e.g., Whitey v. Robertson,  124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888).COAN)ITIONAL  CONSENT
United States to human rights treaties in the international arena while
accommodating domestic concerns.  They achieved these dual aims by
ratifying  the treaties  with  a set of conditions.  These conditions  take
the  form  of  reservations,  understandings,  and  declarations-collec-
tively, "RUDs"-to U.S. ratification.  The RUDs  address  each  of the
challenges outlined above.  With regard to the problem of substance,
U.S. treatymakers  decline to commit the United States to certain sub-
stantive  provisions  in  the treaties.  With  regard  to  the  problems  of
scope and structure, the treatymakers  declare that the treaties are not
self-executing  and  thus  not  enforceable  in  U.S.  courts  until  imple-
mented  by congressional  legislation.  Treatymakers  also  express  an
understanding  that some  provisions  of the  treaties  may  be  imple-
mented  by state  and  local  governments  rather  than  by  the federal
government.
Many international law commentators  have argued that the RUDs
are legally invalid, bad policy, or both.4  With respect to legal validity,
commentators  argue, among other things:  that the reservations vio-
late intemational  law restrictions  on  treaty conditions;  that the non-
self-execution  declarations  are  inconsistent  with  the  Supremacy
Clause  of the  Constitution;  and  that the  federalism  understandings
are inconsistent with  the national government's  responsibility, under
both domestic and intemational  law, for treaty violations.  As for the
4 See, e.g.,  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International  Cove-
nant on  Civil and Political Rights  by  the  United States, 42  DEPAUL  L.  REv.  1169,  1173
(1993);  Lori  Fisler  Damrosch,  The  Role  of the  United States  Senate  Concerning "Self-
Executing" and  NVon-Self-Executing" Treaties,  67 CHi.-KENT  L. REv.  515, 532  (1991);  Mal-
Nina  Halberstam,  United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women,  31  GEO.  WASH.  J.  INT'L L. &  ECON.  49,  50  (1997);
Louis Henkin,  U.S. Ratiflcation of Human Rights Treaties:  The Ghost of Senator  Bricker, 89
AM\f.J.  L'.a"L L. 341,  342-50 (1995); Ved  P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban
on the Death Penalty  forJuvenile Offenders: An Appraisal  Under the International  Covenant on
Civil and  Political  Rights, 42  DEPAUL L. REV. 1311,  1335  (1993);JordanJ.  Paust, Avoiding
"Fraudulent"Executive  Policy:  Analysis of  Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and  Po-
litical Rights, 42  DEPAUL  L.  REv.  1257,  1283  (1993); John  Quigley,  The International
Covenant on Civil and  Political  Rights and the Supremacy Clause,  42 DEPAUL L. REV.  1287,
1302-03  (1993);  Stefan A. Riesenfeld  & Frederick  M.  Abbott,  The Scope of U.S.  Senate
Control Over the  Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67  CHI.-KENT  L.  REv.  571,  643
(1991); William A.  Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International  Covenant on Civil and
Political  Rights:  Is the United States Still a Party  ,,  21  BROOLJ.  INT'L L. 277, 285  (1995);
David Weissbrodt,  United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63  MINN.  L.
REX.  35,  77  (1978); Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note,  The Domestic Legal Effect of Declara-
tions That Treaty Provisions  Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEX. L. REv%.  233, 238  (1979); Louis
N. Schulze,Jr., Note,  The United  States'Detention of  Refugees: Evidence of the Senate's Flawed
Ratification of the International  Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights, 23  NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT  641  (1997).
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policy objections to RUDs,  commentators  have argued that they show
disrespect  for international law and, in  the words of Professor Louis
Henkin, "threaten[]  to undermine a half-century of effort to establish
international human rights standards as international law. ' 5
This  Article  challenges  the  conventional  academic  wisdom  con-
cerning both the legality and desirability of RUDs attached to human
rights  treaties.  The RUDs, we  argue,  reflect a sensible accommoda-
tion of competing domestic and international considerations.  Among
other things, they help bridge the political divide between isolationists
who want to preserve the United States's sovereign  prerogatives, and
internationalists  who want  the United  States  to increase  its involve-
ment in international institutions-a divide that has had a debilitating
effect  on  U.S.  participation  in  international  human  rights  regimes
since the late  1940s.  Perhaps more importantly,  the  RUDs help rec-
oncile  fundamental  changes  in international  law with  the  require-
ments  of the  U.S.  constitutional  system.  The  RUDs  achieve  these
ends, we contend, in ways that are valid under both international and
domestic law.
To date, courts have enforced the RUDs, but no court has consid-
ered their validity in any detail.6  The practical significance of the issue
was  illustrated  recently  in a Nevada death penalty  case, Domingues v.
State. 7  In that case, the State of Nevada sentenced Michael Domingues
to  death for  two murders  committed  when he  was  sixteen  years  of
age."  The  U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit the execution of sixteen-year-old  offenders.9  Dom-
ingues  nevertheless  challenged  his  death  sentence  in  the  Nevada
courts  on  the ground that it was  inconsistent  with  the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral  treaty ratified by
the United States in 1992.1°  This treaty contains  a provision prohibit-
ing the imposition of a death sentence for the commission  of a crime
Henkin, supra  note 4, at 349.
6 See,  e.g.,  Igartua de la Rosa v.  United States,  32  F.3d 8,  10  n.1  (1st  Cir.  1994);
Sandhu v. Burke, No. 97 Civ. 4608 (JGK),  2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3584, at *32  (S.D.N.Y.
Feb.  10,  2000);  Ralk v. Lincoln  County, 81  F. Supp. 2d  1372,  1380  (S.D. Ga.  2000);
Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956  (N.D. Ill. 1998);Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d
353,  362 (D.NJ.  1998); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp.  1380,  1387  (E.D. Wash.  1998);
In re Cheung, 968  F. Supp. 791,  803  n.17  (D.  Conn.  1997); Domingues v. State,  961
P.2d 1279, 1280  (Nev. 1998).
7  961 P.2d at 1279.
8Id.
9  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,  380 (1989).
10  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.  16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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by a person under the age of eighteen."  When it ratified the treaty,
however,  the United States  attached a reservation  stating that it did
not consent to this provision, as well  as a declaration  stating that the
entire treaty was non-self-executing.  Domingues contended that these
conditions were invalid and should thus be disregarded by U.S. courts.
Although  a majority of the  Nevada  Supreme  Court rejected  this ar-
gument, 2  two  dissenting justices  took Domingues's  treaty  argument
seriously."  Arguments  similar  to  those  made  by  Domingues  were
made recently in connection  with executions  scheduled in a number
of other states.
4
Our  analysis proceeds  as  follows.  Part  I  describes  the historical
background  of the  RUDs and their principal features.  Part II  shows
that the international law objections to the RUDs are questionable on
their own  terms and that, in any event, the conclusion usually drawn
from these objections-that the United States is bound by the human
rights  treaties  as  if it had never attached  the RUDs-is inconsistent
with international law principles relating to national consent.  Part III
demonstrates  that, regardless of the legality of the RUDs under inter-
national law, they are valid under domestic constitutional law and thus
must be enforced by U.S. courts.  Finally, Part IV discusses a variety of
functional  benefits-including  benefits  for  international  human
rights  law-associated  with  the  treatymakers'  conditional  consent
power.
I.  HISTORY, PURPOSES,  AND CONTENT OF RUDS
This Part sets out the background needed to evaluate  the validity
of the RUDs.  Part IA provides  a brief history of conditional  consent
in the United States, from the Founding until World War II.  Part I.B
n  Id., art. 6, par.  5,  999 U.N.T.S at 174 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age .... ").
:24 Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
Id. at  1280-81  (Springer & Rose, iU.,  dissenting).  After requesting  the views of
the Solicitor General, Domingues v. Nevada,  526 U.S.  1156 (1999),  the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Domingues's petition for review.  Domingues v. Nevada,  120 S.  Ct. 396
(1999).  The Solicitor General argued that the petition should be denied.  Brief for the
United States as Amicus  Curiae, Domingues v. Nevada, 526  U.S. 1156  (1999)  (No. 98-
8327)  [hereinafter Domingues Brief].
14 See  e.g., Ex Parte  Pressley, No.  1981061,  2000 Ala. LEXIS 30, at *15*16  (Jan. 28,
2000); McFarland v. State, 989 S.W.2d  899, 906 (Ark. 1999); Raymond Bonner, Georgia
Execution is Stayed in Case of Youthful  Offender, N.Y. TiES, Aug. 23, 2000, at A12; Frank
Green,  Two Juvenile Offenders Face Execution; Gilmore, High Court Asked  to Spare Them,
RICH.  TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 10,  2000, at BI;  United Press International,  Texas Inmate
Executed  for Teen MurderJan.  25, 2000.
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then explains how the development of international human rights law
after  World War II led  U.S.  treatymakers  to  embrace  the  particular
RUDs that are the focus of this Article.  Part I.C describes these RUDs
in detail.
A.  A Brief  History of Conditional  Consent
The  U.S.  treatymaking  process  operates  essentially  as  follows."
Representatives  of the President negotiate the terms of the treaty with
foreign  nations,  and  the  President  or  his  representative  signs  the
completed draft."  The President then transmits the treaty to the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent.  If the treaty receives  the required two-
thirds vote, the Senate  sends a resolution  to the President approving
the treaty.
7  The President has the discretion at this point to ratify or
not ratify the treaty. 8  Ratification is the act by which a nation formally
declares its intent to be bound by a treaty.  When the President signs
the instrument  of ratification  and  the Secretary  of State  affixes  the
Seal of the  United  States,  the U.S.  ratification  process  is  complete.
Even  at this  point, however, the  United  States is  not bound by  the
terms of the treaty.  The  treaty  only becomes binding on the  United
States when  the  instrument of ratification  is  either  exchanged,  as  is
usually the process with respect to bilateral treaties,  or deposited at a
specified  place,  as  is  usually the process  with  respect  to multilateral
treaties. 9
On  numerous  occasions  throughout U.S.  history,  the  President
and Senate have proposed  conditions in connection with their ratifi-
cation of treaties.  Indeed, approximately fifteen percent of all Article
II treaties since the Founding have been ratified subject to conditions
that require subsequent assent from other treaty parties."  Usually the
Senate  has proposed  these conditions,  but sometimes  the  President
has as well."  The  treatymakers have used a variety of labels for these
15 See  CONGRESSIONAL  RESEARCH  SERV.,  TREATIES  AND  OTHER  INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS:  THE ROLE  OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE,  103d Cong.,  1st Sess., at 75-
120 (1993)  [hereinafter CRS  STUDY]  (describing the various stages of the U.S. treaty-
making process).
16 Id. at 69-70.
1  Id. at 107.
is Id. at 109.
'9 Id. at 8386.
20 Kevin  C. Kennedy,  Conditional  Approval of Treaties by  the U.S. Senate, 19  LOY. L.A.
INT'L &  COMp.  L..  89, 91, 97 (1996).
21 CRS  STUDY,  supra note  15,  at 96-98;  GEORGE H.  HAYNES,  THE  SENATE  OF THE
UNITED  STATES 609-10  (1938).COADITIONAL CONSENT
conditions,  including  "amendment,"  "reservation,"  "understanding,"
"declaration," and  "proviso."22  For purposes of this Article,  the three
most important  forms  of conditional  consent, whatever  their labels,
have  been  the power  not to  consent  to  particular  treaty  terms,  the
power to consent to a treaty on the condition that it has no domestic
force in the absence  of congressional implementation, and the power
to take  account of the United States's federal structure in negotiating
and implementing a treaty.
Consider first the treatymakers'  power not to consent to particular
treaty terms.  There is no question that the President's  "Power ...  to
make  Treaties"2  entails the power  to withhold consent  to particular
treaty terms.  Without the power to condition consent on the negotiat-
ing partner's acceptance  of proposed terms, the President would lack
the power  to negotiate.  This is why the  President has, since our na-
tion's beginning, exercised the power to refuse to agree to particular
treaty terms.  The President has always exercised plenary discretion in
this regard, and it has always been understood  that he can decline to
ratify a treaty for any reason, even after the Senate has given its advice
and consent.
4
The Senate too has  always exercised  the power not to consent to
particular  treaty  terms, but it has exercised  this  power in a different
way and for different reasons.2  The Senate's  power to "consent" en-
tails the power to block ratification  of a treaty by withholding its con-
sent.  Since  the  1790s,  this greater power  to withhold  consent alto-
gether  has been  viewed  as including  the  lesser  power to  consent to
some provisions of the treaty but not others.  The exercise of the con-
ditional consent power has been in part a response by the Senate to its
loss of any substantial "advice" role in the treaty process.  Many of the
Founders  believed  that  the advice  function  required  that the  Presi-
dent  consult  with  the  Senate  prior  to  negotiating  and  signing  a
treaty. '  During the Washington  administration, however, this process
Z.,  Under international  law, treaty conditions, regardless of how they are labeled by
particular  nations, are  considered  "reservations"  if they "purport[]  to  exclude  or to
modify the legal  effect of certain provisions of the  treaty  in their application  to that
State."  Vienna  Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,  1969,  art. 2(1) (d),  1155
U.N.T.S. 331,  333, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681  [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'  See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN  AFFAIRS AND THE  UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION  184
(2d ed. 1996)  ("Once  the Senate has consented, the President is free to make (or not
to make) the treaty and the Senate has no further authority in respect of it.").
See CRS STUDy, supra  note 15, at 102-04.
2'.  RALSTON  FftYDEN,  THE SENATE  AND TREATIES,  1789-1817, at 18-20  (1920);  Ar-
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proved  unwieldy,  and the President  began  to submit  treaties  to  the
27 Senate  without prior consultation.  Since then, the  Senate  has not
played a substantial  role in advising the President in connection with
21 treaty negotiations.  In order to preserve its ability  to advise regard-
ing treaty terms, the Senate instead began  the practice  of condition-
ing its consent on amendments to the negotiated treaty.'
The first example  of such conditional  consent by the Senate  oc-
curred  in  connection  with  the Jay Treaty  with  Great  Britain.!  This
treaty, negotiated byJohnJay in 1794, was designed to resolve a variety
of compensation,  trade,  and boundary  disputes between  the  United
States and Great Britain.  The  treaty was  controversial  in the United
States due to concerns that the Washington administration  had made
too many concessions  to the British.  A bare two-thirds  of the Senate
gave  their advice  and consent to  the treaty in  1795,  but only  on the
condition  that an  article  of the  treaty  reserving  to  Great Britain  the
right to restrict trade  between the United States and the British West
Indies be suspended.
3
1  Britain  accepted  this condition without com-
plaint, and the treaty was ratified.s2  A few years later, the Senate gave
its advice and consent to a treaty with Tunisia on the condition that an
thur Bestor,  "Advice"  From the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End Is Achieved, 83 AM.
J.  INT'L L. 718  (1989);Jack N. Rakove,  Solving a Constitutional  Puzzle:  The Treatymaking
Clause  as a Case Study, 1 PERSPS. IN AM.  HIsT. 233, 257 (1984).
27  HAYDEN,  supra  note 26, at 11-16.
28  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE  UNITED
STATES § 303, reporters' note 3  (1987).  Although it generally has not had a significant
advice role in the treaty process, the Senate is sometimes involved in the treaty process
before and during the negotiation stage.  The Senate sometimes proposes subjects for
treatymaking  and approves treaty negotiators, and sometimes  individual senators are
part of the negotiating team.  CRS STUDY, supra note 15, at 69-81.
See  CRS  STUDY,  supra note  15,  at 96;  SAMUEL  B.  CRANDALL,  TREATIES,  THEIR
MAKING AND  ENFORCEMENT  70  (1904);  HAYDEN,  supra note 26, at 110-11;  HENKIN, su-
pra note 24, at 180.
30  Treaty of Amity, Commerce  and Navigation,  Nov. 19,  1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,  8 Stat.
116.  For a discussion of the historical events surrounding the Jay Treaty, see STANLEY
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM,  375-449  (1993).
31  The Senate stated that it was consenting to the treaty:.
on condition that there  be added to the said treaty an article whereby it shall
be agreed to suspend the operation of so much of the 12th article, as respects
the trade which his said Majesty thereby consents  may be carried on, between
the United States and his islands in West Indies.
SENATE EXEC.JOURNAL,  4TH CONG., Special Sess.,June 24, 1795, at 186.
32 HAYDEN,  supra  note 26, at 87; HAYNES,  supra note 21, at 607-08.  The Senate also
began  attaching interpretive conditions to its consent early in  U.S.  history.  For exam-
ple, in consenting to a 1796  treaty between  the United States and the Creek Indians,
the Senate stated that provisions  in the treaty allowing the federal government to  es-
tablish military and trading posts in the Creeks's  territory should not be construed  to
preempt rights Georgia had been claiming in this land.  HAYDEN,  supra  note 26, at 99.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
article in  the  treaty  be  suspended  and renegotiated,  and the article
was in fact renegotiated prior to ratification."  The Senate again exer-
cised its conditional  consent power in connection with an 1800 treaty
between the United States and France.m
The United States's treaty partners did not always respond favora-
bly to the Senate's conditions.  In negotiating an 1803 boundary treaty
with  the  United States,  Great Britain  would  not accept  the  amend-
ment proposed by the Senate, and the treaty was never ratified."  The
head  of the British Foreign  Office at that time  criticized  the  United
States's  conditional  consent  practice,  calling  it  "new, unauthorized
and not to be sanctioned.""  Great Britain similarly complained about
conditions proposed by the Senate in connection with an  1824 treaty
concerning the African slave trade."  Over time, however, this practice
became  generally  accepted  by  the  international  community.Y  The
United  States  engaged in this practice  in connection  with numerous
treaties during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, generally
without controversy, as did many of its treaty partners."  This practice
of not consenting to particular  treaty terms has continued to the pres-
ent day.
The second type of conditional  consent of importance  to this Ar-
"A  Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 28, 1797, U.S.-Tunis., T.S. No.
360, at 1088 n.1.  The article in question provided for the imposition of customs duties
to be  paid  by  citizens  of each  country upon goods  carried  into  the other  country.
Among other things, the Senate objected  to this article on the ground that it violated
most  favored  nation  clauses  in  treaties  the  United  States  had  with  other  nations.
HAYDEN,  supra note 26, at 109-11.
t  The  Senate gave  its consent on  the  conditions that one  of the articles  of the
treaty be expunged and that the operation of the treaty be limited to a period of eight
years  from the time of the  exchange of ratifications.  HAYDEN,  supra note 26, at 121.
This treat) was subsequently ratified subject to the Senate's conditions.  Id. at 123-24.
"'.  The  treaty was  the King-Hawkesbury  Convention.  The proposed  amendment
would have deleted an article of the treaty that the Senate was worried might interfere
with U.S. rights in the newly purchased Louisiana Territory.  HAYDEN, supra note 26, at
145-56.
'9 Id. at 150.
,7  5JouN BASSETT MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTEPLNATIONAL  LAw  § 748, at 200  (1906).
In response, then-Secretary of State Henry Clay reminded  Great Britain that the Sen-
ate's conditional  consent power  was a function  of the  constitutional  division  of the
treat), power between  the President and the Senate and  that this was something  that
"the government of the United States has always communicated  to the foreign powers
with which it treats, and to none more fully than to the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Ireland."  ROBERT T.  DEvIrN, THE TREATY  POWER UNDER THE  CONSTITUTION
OFTHE UNITED STATES § 64, at 61-62 n.18 (1908).
See HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 156.
For examples,  see DAvID  HUNTER  MIL=ER,  RESERVATIONS  TO  TREATIES:  THEIR
EFFECT AND THE PROCEDURE  IN REGARD THERETO  (1919).
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ticle is the power to render the treaty without domestic force  unless
and until Congress enacts federal implementing legislation.  Although
the particular  "non-self-execution"  clauses  attached  to  human  rights
treaties  appear  to  be  a modem  phenomenon,  the proposition  that
treaties  and  other federal  laws  may be  non-self-executing  has  been
well established throughout U.S. history.0  Moreover, there are at least
two  longstanding  precursors  to  the  modem  non-self-execution
clauses.
41  First, in a number of instances in the nineteenth and early
twentieth  centuries,  U.S.  treatymakers  consented  to  treaties  on  the
condition that the treaties, or particular articles in the treaties, would
take  effect  only  after  Congress  passed  legislation  implementing
them.
4
'  These  conditions  were,  in  essence,  international non-self-
execution clauses.  They differed from the modem non-self-execution
clauses in that they prevented the  treaty provisions from binding the
United  States  until  Congress  acted,  whereas  the  modem  non-self-
execution  clauses simply prevent the treaty  provisions from being en-
forced in  U.S. courts until Congress acts.  Nevertheless,  these  condi-
tions  were  designed  to  accomplish  precisely  the  same  goal  as  the
modern non-self-execution  clauses:  inclusion  of the House  of Repre-
sentatives in the domestic implementation of treaties.4 3
Another precursor to the modem  non-self-execution  clauses were
the  instances,  dating  back  to  at  least  the late  1800s,  in  which  the
United States expressly  reserved certain treaty implementation  issues
40  See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
41 Many of the following examples can be found in Louis Henkin,  The Treaty Makers
and the Law Makers:  The Niagara  Reservation, 56 COLUM.  L. REv. 1151  (1956).
These  conditions  were  especially  common  in  connection  with  bilateral  trade
agreements  because  of the concern  that the Constitution might require that changes
in  U.S. import  duties originate  in  the  House  of Representatives.  See  I  WESTEL  W.
WILLOUGHBY,  THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED  STATES 558-60 (2d ed. 1929).
For example, an  1854 trade  treaty with Great Britain provided  that it would not take
effect until  the U.S.  Congress  and the British Parliament  enacted  "laws  required  to
carry it into operation."  Reciprocity Treaty with  Great Britain, June 5,  1854, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., art. 5,  10 Stat. 1089,  1092.  Similarly, a provision in an  1875 trade treaty with Ha-
waii  stated that the treaty would not take  effect "until a law to carry it into operation
shall have been passed by the Congress  of the United States of America."  Convention
between  the United  States of America  and His  Majesty the King of the Hawaiian  Is-
lands,Jan. 30, 1875, U.S.-Hawaii, art. V,  19 Stat. 625, 627.  Additionally, in a 1902 trade
treaty with Cuba, the Senate added an amendment stating that the Convention "shall
not take effect until the same shall have been approved by the Congress."  Commercial
Convention between the United States and Cuba, Dec.  11,  1902, U.S.-Cuba,  art. 11,  33
Stat.  2136,  2142.  The  Supreme  Court  subsequently  gave  effect  to  the  Senate's
amendment of the Cuba treaty in United States v. American Sugar  Refining Co.,  202 U.S.
563  (1906).
43 SeeWILLOUGHBY, supra  note 42, at 558.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
for Congress.  For example, in an  1899  treaty with  Spain concerning
the  acquisition  of Puerto  Rico  and  the Philippines,  the  U.S.  treaty-
makers included a provision stating that "[t]he  civil rights and politi-
cal  status of the native inhabitants  of the  territories hereby ceded  to
the United States shall be  determined by the  Congress."4  Similarly,
the Senate  gave  its  advice and  consent to  a  1920  treaty  with Austria
with the stipulation  that the United States would not be represented
in  or participate  in  any international  body authorized  by  the  treaty
"unless  and until an Act  of the Congress  of the United  States  shall
provide for such representation or participation. "4
7
A  third  type  of conditional  consent  of relevance  to  this Article
concerns  the  United  States's  federal  structure  of  government.
Throughout U.S. history, the treatymakers  have used their conditional
consent powers  to guard  against undue intrusions  on state  preroga-
tives.  At times,  they have limited  the substantive  terms of treaties  to
protect state interests.4 '  At other  times, they have  made  treaties de-
pendent on state law,4 7 or have expressly limited U.S. treaty obligations
44 Treaty  of Peace  Between  the  United  States  of America  and  the  Kingdom  of
Spain, Dec. 10,  1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 Stat.  1754, 1759.  Several Supreme  Court
Justices  expressly  endorsed the validity of this provision.  See Downes v. Bidwell,  182
U.S. 244,  340-41  (1901)  (White, J., concurring).  The entire Court referred  to  it ap-
provingly in dicta in Dor  v.  United States, 195 U.S.  138,  143  (1904).  See also Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S.  176,  182,  184-85  (1901)  (Brown, J., concur-
ring) (stating that there was "no doubt" that the U.S.  treatymakers could provide  that
customs  relations between  territories  ceded by  treaty and  the United States  "should
remain unchanged until legislation had been had upon the subject").
45 Treaty of Peace Between  the United States and Austria, Aug. 24, 1921,  U.S.-Aus.,
42 Stat. 1946,  1949.  An identical provision was included in a post-World War I peace
treaty  with Germany.  Treaty of Peace Between  the United States and Germany,  Aug.
25,  1921,  U.S.-F.R.G.,  42  Stat. 1939, 1945.  Another example of an early twentieth cen-
tury condition designed to limit a treaty's domestic effect was a statement by the Senate
in consenting to a 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan that the treaty
.shall  not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions" in a specified immigra-
tion statute.  Mt.LER, supra note 39, at 60-63.
41, See, e.g., Ralston Hayden,  The States'Rights  Doctrine and the Treaty-Making  Power,  22
AM. HIST.  REV.  566, 585  (1917)  (explaining that, between  1830 and  1860, "the Senate
and the executive  entertained  grave and increasing doubts concerning their authority
to make  treaties" concerning  rights to real  property and that "in every  particular in-
stance  in which  conflict arose  the treaty in question  was  amended to  bring it more
nearly into accord with the states' rights theory").
See,  e.g.,  Consular  Convention  Between  the United  States  of America  and His
Majesty the Emperor of the French,  Feb. 23, 1853, U.S.-Fr.,  art. VII,  10  Stat. 992, 996
(allowing French citizens to possess land equally with  U.S. citizens  "[i]n all the States
of the Union whose existing  laws permit it, so long and to the same extent as the said
laws  shall  remain in force" and promising  that the President would  "recommend to
[other states]  the passage of such laws as may be necessary for the purpose of confer-
ring this right").
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to matters "'within the jurisdiction'  of the federal government."' 8  The
federalism clauses attached by the treatymakers  to the U.S. ratification
of modem human rights treaties reflect this tradition.
In sum,  since the  early days of the nation, the President and the
Senate  have attached a variety of conditions to  their consent  to trea-
ties.  No court has ever invalidated these conditions.  On the contrary,
the Supreme Court has referred to the treatymakers'  conditional  con-
sent power approvingly in several decisions,49 and the state courts and
lower federal courts have almost uniformly given effect to these condi-
tions.
50
B.  Human Rights Treaties and the Bricker  Amendment Debates
Before World War  II, international law primarily  regulated inter-
actions among nations,  and it did  not contain  extensive  protections
for individual rights.5'  Soon after the War, with the experience  of the
Holocaust and other atrocities  fresh in mind, the  international  com-
munity began  to develop  a comprehensive  body  of international  hu-
man rights law.  The seeds of this human  rights law revolution were
sown in the  1940s.  The  United  Nations  Charter, which  came  into
force  in  1945,  contained  general  commitments  to  protect  human
rights.  Three  years  later,  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly
adopted the Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment of the
Crime  of Genocide" 5  and  opened  it for national  ratifications.  That
48  HENKIN, supra  note 24, at 192 n.*; Henkin, supra note 4, at 345.
4  In addition  to the decisions cited supra notes 42 and 44, see James v. Dravo Con-
tracting  Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937)  (noting that "it is familiar practice for the Senate
to  accompany  [its  consent to  treaties]  with  reservations");  Haver v.  Yaker, 76  U.S.  (9
Wall.)  32,  35  (1869)  (noting  that the Senate  is  "not required  to adopt or reject  [a
treaty]  as a whole, but  may modify or amend it").  See also United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353, 374-75  (1989)  (Scalia,J., concurring)  ("[The Senate]  ...  may, in the form of
a resolution, give its consent  [to  a treaty]  on the basis of conditions.");  Fourteen Dia-
mond Rings, 183  U.S. at 183  (Brown, J., concurring)  ("The Senate ...  may  refuse  its
ratification,  or make such  ratification conditional upon the adoption  of amendments
to the treaty.").
50  For recent citations, see supra  note 6.  The only judicial decision suggesting lim-
its on the conditional consent power is Power  Authority of New  York v. Federal  Power Com-
mission, 247 F.2d  538  (D.C. Cir. 1957),  vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as
moot sub nom. American Public Power  Association v. Power  Authority of New York,  355 U.S. 64
(1957),  discussed infra text accompanying notes 236-46.
51  For discussions  of pre-World War  II  international  law  protections for human
rights, see Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  POLITICS AND VALUES  169-73  (1995);
STEPHEN D. KRASNER,  SOVEREIGNTY:  ORGANIZED HYPOcRIsY 73-126 (1999).
52 U. N. CHARTER art. 1, para.  3.
53  Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
same year, the General Assembly issued its nonbinding, but nonethe-
less influential,  Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights.54  The Uni-
versal  Declaration,  which  aspired  to  be  a  "common  standard  of
achievement  for  all  peoples  and  all  nations," 5  contained  broadly
worded  civil,  political, economic, social, and cultural rights.  Immedi-
ately  following  the passage  of the  Declaration,  the  United  Nations
Commission  on Human  Rights began  drafting a human  rights cove-
nant that aimed to convert the nonbinding provisions of the Declara-
tion into binding treaty obligations."
United  States  officials  played  a  prominent  role  in  creating  the
emerging  international  regime  of human  rights  law.  Nonetheless,
there were intense debates in the United States during the  1950s over
whether and to what extent  the nation should participate  in this  re-
gime.  These  debates  focused principally  on  the  domestic implica-
tions of ratifying  the human  rights treaties.  Some  people were  con-
cerned  that the  U.N.  Charter's  human  rights  provisions  would  give
Congress the  power to enact civil rights legislation  otherwise  beyond
its  constitutional  powers.58  This was  a plausible belief in light  of the
Supreme  Court's  decision  in  Missouri v.  Holland, which  held  that,
when implementing a treaty, Congress is not subject to the federalism
limitations  applicable  to the exercise  of its Article  I powers."  A re-
lated concern  was that the U.N. Charter would preempt state  laws by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause.6o In fact, this argument was seemingly
endorsed by one lower California court and four justices  of the U.S.
Supreme Court in their consideration  of the  validity of a California
alien  land  ownership  statute."  The  potentially  self-executing  nature
"  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY,  UNITED  NATIONS,  UNIVERSAL  DECLARATION  OF  HUMAN
RIGHTS,  U.N.  Doc.  A/810,  U.N.  Sales  No.  1952.1.15  (1952)  [hereinafter  UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION].
5 Id. para.  8.
This drafting process would eventually lead to the promulgation of two human
rights treaties-the Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights, and the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  See LELAND M.  GOODRICH,  THE UNITED  NATIONS
247-53  (1959)  (describing the transition  from the nonbinding Declaration to the obli-
gations of the covenants).
5  See generally NATALIE  HEVENER  KAUFMAN,  HuMAN  RIGHTS  TREATIES  AND  THE
SENATE  (1990);  DUANE  TANANBAUM,  THE  BRICKER  AMENDMENT  CONTROVERS:  A
TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  (1988).
5  See generaly  TANANBAUM,  supra  note 57.
'i  252 U.S. 416,433  (1920).
TANANBAUM,  supra  note 57, at 1-15.
See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.  633, 649  (1948)  (Black, J., concurring, joined
by Douglas, J.); id. at 673  (Murphy, J., concurring, joined  by Rutledge, J.); Sei Fujii v.
State, 217 P.2d 481,487 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1950),  vacated,  242 P.2d 617  (Cal. 1952).
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of the Charter was particularly worrisome  to some in the early days of
the anticommunist  Cold War period  because  the Universal  Declara-
tion,  including  its very progressive  provisions  concerning  economic,
social, and cultural rights,2  was described by its proponents  as giving
content to the vague human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter."
Another  event  that  triggered concerns  in  the  United States was
President Truman's submission of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  to the Senate in 1948.  Al-
though  the  United  States  had  helped  to  draft  the  Convention  and
supported  an  international  prohibition  on genocide,  many senators
and others worried about the domestic consequences  of ratifying the
treaty.  One of their central concerns  was  the vagueness  of the  Con-
vention's definition of "genocide."  The Convention defined genocide
to  include  certain  acts  "committed  with  intent  to  destroy"  covered
groups, including the act of causing "mental harm" to members of cov-
ered groups.64  The unease  over these  definitional  provisions related
to their possible inconsistency with the First Amendment, their poten-
tial use as  a basis  for prosecuting U.S.  military officials  abroad,  and
their foreseeable  use  in support of a  claim that  U.S. policies toward
African-Americans  and  Native  Americans  constituted  genocide."
There was also a more general concern about the erosion of U.S. sov-
ereignty and independence.
These various  concerns  led  to  proposals  in  the  1950s  to  amend
the  Constitution  to  limit  the  treaty  powers  of the  United  States."
Along with leaders  of the American Bar Association, a key proponent
of such  an  amendment  was Senator John  Bricker of Ohio, and  the
various proposed amendments are commonly referred tojointly as the
"Bricker Amendment."6  In general, the proposed amendments were
intended to preclude  treaties from being self-executing  and to make
clear  that  treaties  would  not  override  the  reserved  powers  of  the
62  The  Declaration states,  among other things, that "[elveryone"  has  the right to
employment, to equal  pay for equal work, to  membership in trade unions, to an ade-
quate standard of living, to an education, and to participation in the cultural life of the
community.  UNIVERSAL DECLARATION,  supra  note 54, arts. 23-27.
63  In fact, the lower court's decision in Sei Fujfii relied on the Universal Declaration
in interpreting the meaning of the United Nations Charter.  217 P.2d at 487-88.
64  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,  Dec.
9, 1948, art. H, 78 U.N.T.S. 277  (emphasis added) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
65  For a summary of the lengthy congressional  hearings  in which  these and other
concerns were articulated, see KAUFMAN,  supra  note 57, at 42-59.
6Id.
67  See generally  TANANBAUM,  supra  note 57.
6Id.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
states'  Some versions also would have restricted the use of executive
agreements."  There was  substantial consideration of these proposals
during the 1950s.
7
1  In fact, one of the proposed amendments fell only
one vote short of obtaining the necessary  two-thirds  vote in the Sen-
ate. 7 ,
To help  defeat the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower  admini-
stration made a commitment that it would not seek to become a party
to any more  human  rights  treaties.7 3  Secretary of State John  Foster
Dulles announced  during  the Bricker Amendment  hearings in  1953
that the administration had no intention  of becoming a party to the
then-proposed  human  rights  treaties.7   In  1955,  Dulles  reaffirmed
that "the United States will not sign or become  a party  to  the  cove-
nants  on  human  rights,  the  convention  on  the  political  rights  of
women, and certain other proposed multilateral agreements.  In the
same year, the State Department published a circular stating, in obvi-
ous reference  to the Bricker Amendment debate, that "[t]reaties  are
not to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social
changes  or  to try to  circumvent the constitutional  procedures  estab-
lished  in  relation  to  what  are  essentially  matters  of  domestic  con-
cern."74  For decades  thereafter, presidents did not submit major hu-
man rights treaties to the Senate  (although  they did continue  to seek
77 the Senate's advice and consent for the Genocide Convention).
,,"  For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that "[a]  treaty
shall  become  effective  as  internal  law  in  the United  States  only  through  legislation
which would be valid in the absence of treaty."  S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. § 2 (1952).
7, For  example,  some  versions  of  the  Bricker  Amendment  provided  that
"[e]xecutive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties."  S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong.
§  4  (1951).
71  See, e.g.,  Treaties and Executive Agreements:  Hearings on S.J. Res.  1 and S..  Res. 43
Before a Subcomm.  of the Senate Comm. on  the Judiciay, 83d Cong.  (1953)  [hereinafter
1953 Hearings].
"! 100 CONG.  REC. 2251  (1954); TANANBAUM,  supra  note 57, at 180.
7,4 KAU,  FMAN,  supra  note 57, at 104-05; TANANBAUM,  supra  note 57, at 89,  199.
74  1953 Hearings, supra note 71,  at  825  (statement  of Secretary  Dulles).  During
these hearings, executive branch officials also assured the Senate that it had the power
to give its consent to human rights treaties  on the condition that they would be  non-
self-executing.  Id. at 922  (testimony of Attorney General Brownell).
75 32 DEP'T ST. BULL. 820, 822  (1955).
U.S. State Dep't Circular No. 175,1  2 (Dec. 13, 1955),  reprinted  in 50 AM. J. INT'L
L. 784,785  (1956).
77  The United  States  did  ratify  three less-controversial  human  rights  treaties  be-
tween  the time of the Bricker Amendment controversy and the Carter administration:
the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions  and Practices  Similar  to Slavery,  opened for signature Sept. 7,  1956,  18  U.S.T.
3201,  266 U.N.T.S.  3; the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,  opened  for sig-
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This  reticence  changed  with  the  Carter  administration,  which
submitted a package of human rights treaties to the Senate in the late
1970s.78  Since that time, every President has urged the Senate to ap-
prove the ratification  of major human rights treaties, and the Senate
has in fact given its advice  and consent to four such  treaties.
79  With
respect  to the  treaties  to which  the Senate  has  given  its advice  and
consent, there has been  a remarkable  consensus across very different
administrations and very different Senates about both the desirability
of ratifying these treaties and  the need to attach  RUDs to the treaties
as a condition of ratification  to protect domestic prerogatives.
As for the desirability of ratifying human rights treaties, presidents
and the Senate have agreed that a failure by the United States to ratify
the major human  rights treaties would result in at least  two kinds  of
foreign policy costs.  First, nonratification  would preclude  the United
States from participating in the treaty-related institutions that, in turn,
influence  the  course  of international  human  rights  law. 8°  Second,
nonratification  would  create  a "troubling  complication"  in  U.S.  di-
plomacy, namely, that the United States could not credibly encourage
other nations  to embrace human  rights norms if it had not itself em-
81 braced those norms.
Presidents  and  the  Senate  have  also  agreed,  however,  that the
modern  human  rights  treaties implicate  serious  countervailing  con-
siderations  reminiscent  of the Bricker Amendment  debates.  These
concerns are easiest to understand with  respect to the most ambitious
of these  treaties,  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political
Rights  ("ICCPR").  The  ICCPR contains  dozens  of vaguely worded
rights guarantees  that differ in  important linguistic  details  from  the
nature Mar. 31,  1953, 27 U.S.T.  1909,  193 U.N.T.S.  135; and the Inter-American  Con-
vention  on the Granting  of Political  Rights  to Women, May  2,  1948,  27 U.S.T. 3301,
O.AS.T.S. No. 3.
78 In 1978, the Carter Administration  transmitted four human rights treaties to the
Senate:  the International Convention  on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination,  Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.  195; the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, oenedfor signature  Dec.  19,  1966, 993 U.N.T.S.  3; the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature  Dec.  19,  1966, 999
U.N.T.S.  171; and the American  Convention  on Human  Rights, Nov.  22,  1969,  1144
U.N.T.S.  123.  In  1980, the Administration transmitted  to the Senate the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,  opened for signature
Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S.  13.
79  See infra  note 86.
See, e.g.,  Four Treaties Relating  to Human  Rights, Hearings  before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 21  (1979)  [hereinafter  1979 Hearings] (testimony of Deputy Sec-
retar  of State Warren Christopher concerning ICCPR).
8  See, e.g., id.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
analogous guarantees under U.S. domestic law.8'  Some of these provi-
sions arguably conflict with U.S. constitutional  guarantees."'  In addi-
tion,  the ICCPR,  if self-executing,  would have  the same  domestic ef-
fect as a congressional statute  and thus would supersede  inconsistent
state law and prior inconsistent federal legislation.  There was concern
that,  even  if courts  ultimately  decided  that each  of the  differently
worded provisions  in the ICCPR did not require a change in domestic
law, litigation of these issues would be costly and would generate  sub-
stantial legal uncertainty.84  These  concerns also  arose, although on a
narrower scale, with respect to the other human rights treaties.
To address these concerns, President Carter and every subsequent
President have included proposed RUDs with their submission of hu-
man  rights treaties  to the Senate.5  The Senate  has given  its advice
For example,  the ICCPR bars "arbitrary arrest or detention,"  requires that any-
one arrested "shall be promptly informed of any charges against him," protects  against
"arbitrary...  interference with ...  privacy, family, home or correspondence,"  guaran-
tees that everyone  "shall have the right to freedom  of thought, conscience and  relig-
ion,"  requires  that  the law  give  "effective  protection  against  discrimination  on  any
ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin,  property, birth or other status,"  guarantees  the "equal right of men
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights," guarantees "the inherent
right to life," ensures that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person," guarantees
the "right to hold opinions without interference," secures "the right to freedom of as-
sociation  with  others,  including  the right to form and join  trade  unions,"  prohibits
"torture or... cruel, inhuman  or degrading  treatment or punishment,"  and guaran-
tees  the  "right  of self-determination[,  including  the  right]  freely  [to]  determine
[one's]  political  status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment."  ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 6-18, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174-78.
4  See, e.g.,  1979 Hearings,  supra note 80, at 30 (testimony of President Carter's State
Department Legal Advisor, Roberts Owen).
X4  See, e.g.,  id. at 40  (testimony of  Jack Goldidang, Department of Justice)  ("If the
treaties were directly enforceable in court, the court would have the difficult job of try-
ing to reconcile how these four treaties fit together with existing [U.S. law].").
President Reagan proposed RUDs in submitting the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment  or Punishment,  apenedfor signa-
ture Dec. 10,  1984, 23  I.L.M.  1027  [hereinafter Torture  Convention],  and in resubmit-
ting the Genocide Convention; President Bush  did the same in resubmitting the Tor-
ture  Convention  and  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights;  and
President Clinton proposed RUDs when he resubmitted the Race  Convention.  In ad-
dition,  presidents  have  proposed  RUDs  for  several  human  rights  treaties  that  the
United States has signed  but not yet ratified, including the American Convention  on
Human Rights, the International  Covenant on Economic,  Social, and Cultural Rights,
and  the  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of All  Forms  of  Discrimination  Against
Women.  See Convention  on  the Elimination of All Forms  of Discrimination  Against
Women,  S. ExEc.  REP.  103-38, at 5  (1994);  Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining  to Human Rights, S. ExEc.  Doc. No. 95-
2,  at viii-xi  (1978)  (describing the International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social and
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and consent to, and the United States has ratified, four of these  trea-
ties:  the Genocide Convention, ratified in 1988; the ICCPR, ratified in
1992;  the Torture  Convention, ratified in  1994;  and the  Convention
on the Elimination of  All Forms of Racial Discrimination, also ratified
in 1994.  The United States included RUDs in the ratification instru-
ments for each of these treaties as a precondition of U.S. ratification.!6
The Senate  usually consented  to the  RUDs in the form proposed by
the President, but sometimes the Senate modified them slightly or re-
quested that the President modify them. 87
C.  An Overview of Modern RUDs
RUDs  are  designed  to  harmonize  the  treaties  with  existing  re-
quirements of U.S.  law and to leave  domestic implementation  of the
treaties to Congress.  They cover a variety of subjects and take a variety
Cultural  Rights); Human  Rights Treaties:  Message  to the Senate,  14 WEEKLY  COMP.
PREs. Doc. 395  (Feb. 23, 1978)  (transmitting human  rights treaties to the Senate and
recommending  consent  to their ratification).  President  Carter was  not  the first  to
propose conditions along with a human rights treaty.  As early as 1950, understandings
and declarations had been proposed in connection with the Genocide Convention.  See
KAUFMAN,  supra note 57, at 206  (listing attachments proposed by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee  for the Genocide  Convention);  see also id. at 197  ("Reservations
have been a key component of human rights treaties from the earliest consideration of
the Genocide Convention.").
86 See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification  of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140  CONG. REC.  S14326
(daily ed. June  24,  1994)  [hereinafter  U.S.  RUDs to  Race  Convention];  U.S.  Senate
Resolution  of Advice and  Consent  to Ratification  of the  International  Covenant  on
Civil and Political Rights,  138  CONG. REc.  S4783  (daily ed. Apr. 2,  1992)  [hereinafter
U.S. RUDs to ICCPR]; U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification  of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment,  136  CONG.  REC.  S17491  (daily ed. Oct.  27,  1990)  [hereinafter  U.S.
RUDs to Torture Convention];  U.S. Senate Resolution of  Advice and Consent to  Rati-
fication of the Convention  on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide,  132 CONG. REc.  S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19,  1986)  [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to Geno-
cide Convention].  The text of these RUDs is available at the University of Minnesota's
excellent  human  rights  library  web  site,  http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/
usres.html.
87  The Reagan Administration's  proposed RUDs to the Torture Convention  were
criticized by some senators and human  rights groups as being too restrictive.  In light
of this criticism, as well as a special request from the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee,  the  Bush  Administration  submitted  a  revised  and  less  restrictive  set of RUDs.
SENATE  COMM.  ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONs,  REPORT  ON  THE  CONVENTION  AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,  INHUMAN,  OR DEGRADING TREATMENT  OR PUNISHMENT,
S. ExEc. REP. NO.  101-30, at 4 (2d Sess.  1990); see also S. EXEC. REP.  NO. 101-30 app. A
(2d Sess.  1990)  (letter from Janet  G. Mullins,  Assistant  Secretary,  Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, to Senator Claiborne Pell, transmitting Bush Administration  Res-
ervations, Understandings and Declarations).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
of forms.  For purposes of analysis,  they can be grouped into five cate-
gories:
Substantive Reservations. Some  RUDs are  reservations pursuant to
which the United States declines  to consent altogether to certain pro-
visions in the treaties.  These reservations are very much the exception
to  the rule;  for each  of the four human fights treaties under consid-
eration,  the United States consented  to a large majority of the provi-
sions.  Some substantive  reservations  are based on potential conflicts
between treaty provisions and U.S. constitutional rights.  For example,
First Amendment  concerns led the United States to decline  to agree
to restrictions  on hate speech in the Race  Convention "to the extent
that  [such speech  is]  protected  by the  Constitution  and laws  of the
United States."  Similarly, the United States attached a reservation to
its  ratification  of the ICCPR,  stating that  the ICCPR's  restriction  on
propaganda for war and hate speech  "does not authorize  or require
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the
right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and
laws of the United States."89
Other  substantive  reservations  are based  not on a  constitutional
conflict but rather on a political or policy disagreement with  certain
provisions of the treaties.  For example,  the United States attached to
its ratification  of the ICCPR reservations  allowing it to impose crimi-
nal punishment  consistent with  the  Fifth,  Sixth, and  Eighth Amend-
ments,  including  capital  punishment  of juvenile  offenders,  notwith-
standing limitations on such punishment in the ICCPRI 9 0  The United
U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 86, para.  1(1), at S14326.
"  U.S. RUDs  to ICCPR,  supra note 86, para.  I(1),  at  S4783.  With  respect to the
Genocide Convention,  the United States sought to  protect First Amendment interests
by  attaching  a  reservation  stating  that  "[n]othing  in  this  Convention  requires  or
authorizes  legislation or other action by the United  States of America  prohibited  by
the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."  U.S. RUDs
to the Genocide  Convention,  supra note  86, para.  1(2),  at S1378;  see also REPORT  OF
THE  COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTION  ON  THE
PREVENTION  AND  PUNISHMENT OF THE  CRIME OF GENOCIDE,  S.  ExEc.  REP. No. 99-2, at
20-21  (1985)  [hereinafter  GENOCIDE CONVENTION  REPORT]  (explaining that this res-
ervation was designed primarily to avoid conflict with the First Amendment). ".  Article  6(5) of the  ICCPR provides  that "[s]entence  of death shall  not be  im-
posed for crimes committed  by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be
carried  out on pregnant women"  and Article 7 provides that "[n]o  one shall be sub-
jected  to  torture  or  to  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishmenL"
ICCPR,  supra note  10, arts. 6(5),  7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.  The pertinent U.S. RUDs pro-
,ided  that  "the United  States  reserves  the  right,  subject  to  its  Constitutional  con-
straints, to impose capital punishment on any person  (other than a pregnant woman)
duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital pun-
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States  attached  a  similar  reservation  with  respect  to  limitations  on
punishment in the Torture Convention.9'  It also attached a condition
to its ratification of the Race Convention making clear that it was not
agreeing to modify the  traditional public/private  distinction  in  U.S.
civil rights law.92
Interpretive Conditions. Some RUDs set forth the United States's in-
terpretation  of vague  treaty  terms,  thereby  clarifying  the  scope  of
United  States  consent.  For  example,  Articles  2(1)  and  26  of the
ICCPR prohibit discrimination not only on the basis of "race, colour,
sex, language,  religion,  political or other  opinion, national  or social
origin,  property,  [and]  birth,"  but  also  on  the  basis  of  any  "other
status."93  The  United States  attached  an  understanding  stating  that
this open-ended prohibition on discrimination  did not preclude legal
distinctions  between  persons  "when  such  distinctions  are,  at  mini-
mum, rationally related to  a legitimate  governmental  objective.""'  It
also  attached a reservation  to both  the ICCPR and  the Torture  Con-
vention  stating that  the United  States considers  itself bound by  the
prohibitions  in  those  treaties  on  "cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading
treatment or punishment"  only to  the extent that such  treatment or
punishment  is  prohibited  by  the  U.S.  Constitution."  The  United
ishment, including such punishment for crimes committed  by persons below eighteen
years of age" and that "the United States considers itself bound by Article  7 to  the ex-
tent that 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'  means the cruel and
unusual treatment  or punishment prohibited  by the Fifth,  Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments  to  the Constitution  of the  United States."  U.S.  RUDs  to ICCPR, supra
note 86, paras. I(2)-(3), at S4783.
91 See U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note 86, para. I(1), at S17491.
[T]he  United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article  16
to prevent 'cruel,  inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,'  only inso-
far  as  the  term  'cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment'
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth  Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.
Id.
92  See U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra  note 86, para. 1(2), at S14326.
To the extent.., that the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private
conduct  [than  is customarily  the  subject  of governmental  regulation],  the
United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention  to enact
legislation or take other measures  under paragraph  (1) of Article 2, subpara-
graphs  (1) (c)  and  (d) of Article 2, Article  3 and Article 5 with respect to pri-
vate conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Id.
93  ICCPR, supra  note 10, arts. 2(1), 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179  (emphasis added).
94  U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra  note 86, para. 11(1),  at S4783.
95  Id. para. I(3),  at S4783; U.S.  RUDs to Torture  Convention, supra note 86, para.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
States  similarly  attached  understandings  to  its  ratification  of  the
Genocide  and Torture  Conventions  clarifying the  circumstances  un-
der which conduct will fall within the terms of these treaties."6
Non-Self-Execution  Declarations.  U.S.  treatymakers  also  have  in-
cluded, when ratifying human rights treaties, declarations stating that
the  substantive  provisions  of  the  treaties  are  not  self-executing.
97
These  declarations are  designed  to preclude  the treaties  from being
enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implementing legislation.
As the  State Department  explained  in submitting the proposed  trea-
ties  to  President  Carter  for  his  transmission  to  the  Senate,  "[w]ith
such declarations, the substantive  provisions of the treaties would not
of themselves become effective as domestic law."98
The  treatymakers  have  given  several  reasons  for  these  declara-
tions.  First, they believe  that, taking into account the substantive  res-
ervations  and  interpretive  conditions,  U.S.  domestic  laws  and reme-
I(1),  at S17491.  These reservations were in part a response  to the European  Court of
Human  Rights's 1989 decision in the Soering case, in which the Court held that a long
wait on death  row would violate the European  Convention on Human Rights's prohi-
bition on "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."  Soering v. United King-
dom,  161  Eur. Ct. H.R  (ser. A)  (1989);  see REPORT OF THE COMMITEE  ON  FOREIGN
RELATIONS,  INTERNATIONAL  COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLmcAL RIGHTS,  S. ExEc. REP.
102-23, at 12 (1992)  [hereinafter ICCPR REPORT];  David P. Stewart,  United States Ratifi-
cation of the Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights:  The Significance of the Reservations, Un-
derstandings,  and  Declarations,  42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1183, 1193 (1993).
The understanding attached to the Genocide  Convention provides  that the re-
quirement in the Convention of an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical,  racial,  or religious  group  as  such" means  "the  specifw intent to destroy,  in
whole or in substantialpart,  a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such."  U.S.
RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra  note 86, para. 11(1),  at S1377  (emphasis added).
The understanding attached to the Torture Convention provides, among other things,
that "in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers  to pro-
longed  mental  harm."  U.S.  RUDs  to  Torture  Convention,  supra note  86,  para.
11(1)  (a), at S17491.
,7  A non-self-execution  declaration  was not attached to the Genocide  Convention,
but the Senate did include a declaration  stating that the President was not to  deposit
the U.S. instrument of ratification  until after Congress had enacted legislation imple-
menting the treaty.  U.S. RUDs  to  Genocide  Convention,  supra note 86, para. III,  at
S1378.  Senator Hatch (who helped fashion the reservations package to the Genocide
Convention)  explained that this declaration meant that, in effect,  "the Genocide  Con-
vention is not to  be self-executing."  132  CONG.  REC. S1252-04  (1986).  Furthermore,
even the implementing legislation for the Convention, which makes genocide a federal
criminal  offense,  states  that  "[n]othing  in  this  chapter  shall  be  construed
as ...  creating any substantive  or procedural  right enforceable  by law by any  party in
anyproceeding."  18 U.S.C. § 1092 (1994).
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Per-
taining to Human Rights,  supra note 85, at vi (letter of submittal from  Dept. of State,
Dec. 17,  1977).
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dies are  sufficient to meet U.S.  obligations under human  rights trea-
ties.99  There  is thus  no additional  need, in their view,  for domestic
implementation.""  Second,  there is concern that the treaty terms,  al-
though similar in substance  to U.S.  law, are not identical in wording
and thus might have a destabilizing effect on domestic rights protec-
tions  if considered  self-executing.
T M  Third,  there  is  disagreement
about which treaty terms, if any, would be self-executing.  The declara-
tion is intended to provide  certainty about this issue in advance of liti-
gation. 
1
2  Finally,  the  treatymakers  believe  that  if there  is  to  be  a
change in the scope of domestic rights protections, it should be done
by legislation with the participation of the House of Representatives."I
At times, the Executive  Branch  and the Senate Foreign  Relations
99  For the Senate's views,  see  INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTION  ON THE  ELIMINATION
OF  ALL  FORMS  OF RACIAL  DISCRIMINATION,  S.  ExEc.  REP.  No.  103-29,  at 6-7  (1994)
[hereinafter  RACE  CONVENTION  REPORT];  ICCPR  REPORT,  supra note  95,  at  10;
CONVENTION  AGAINST  TORTURE  AND  OTHER  CRUEL,  INHUMAN  OR  DEGRADING
TREATMENT  OR  PUNISHMENT,  S.  EXEC.  REP.  No.  101-30,  at  12  (1990)  [hereinafter
TORTURE  CONVENTION  REPORT];  GENOCIDE  CONVENTION  REPORT,  supra note 89,  at
15.  For a representative administration view, see  RACE CONVENTION  REPORT, supra, at
33-34.
100 An  important caveat  should  be  noted here  with  respect  to the  Torture  and
Genocide  Conventions.  For both conventions,  the Senate insisted that the President
not ratify the treaty until Congress enacted legislation to bring U.S. domestic law into
compliance  with  the  treaty.  TORTURE  CONVENTION  REPORT,  supra note  99,  at  20;
GENOCIDE  CONVENTION REPORT, supra  note 89, at 26.
101  For a representative statement, see 1979 Hearings, supra note 80, at 54-55  (State
Department  memorandum)  ("The Covenants  and  U.S. statutes, while  embodying al-
most identical  rights,  are  not identical  in wording.  The  purpose  of the  non-self-
executing declaration, therefore,  is to prevent the subjection of fundamental rights to
differing and possibly confusing standards of protection in our courts.").
102  For example,  the  executive  branch  maintained that  the ICCPR was in its en-
tirety  non-self-executing  by virtue  of both  Article  2(2),  which  provides  that  "each
State ...  undertakes  to  take  the necessary steps..,  to  adopt such  legislative  or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect  to the rights recognized in this Covenant,"
and the ICCPR's official annotation, which provides  that "the obligation  to give effect
to the rights recognized in the  covenant would be  carried out by States through  the
adoption of legislative  or other measures."  ICCPR,  supra  note 10, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-
74;  see 1979 Hearings,  supra  note 80, at 315  (memorandum of Roberts Owen, Legal Ad-
viser to the State Department).  This view was challenged on the basis of other provi-
sions in the ICCPR.  See, e.g.,  1979 Hearings, supra  note 80, at 276-77 (statement of Os-
car Schachter); id. at 287-88 (statement of Louis Henkin).
103 For  example,  in  defending  such  a declaration  before  the  ICCPR's  Human
Rights  Committee,  the  State Department  explained  that  "the decision  to  make  the
treaty 'non-self-executing'  reflects a strong preference,  both within the Administration
and in the Senate, not to use the unicameral  treaty power of the U.S. Constitution to
effect direct changes in  the domestic law of the United States."  Press Release,  State-
ment by Conrad K. Harper to the Human Rights Committee, USUN Press Release #49-
(95), at 3 (Mar. 29, 1995)  (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
Committee  have  stated  that  the  non-self-execution  declarations  are
intended to clarify  that the treaties will not create  a private cause  of
action in U.S. courts.'  Relying on these statements, Professor David
Sloss  has argued that, by negative  implication,  the  U.S. treatymakers
intended for the human rights treaties to be applied by U.S. courts in
situations not requiring the creation of a private cause of action-for
example,  as a  defense  to a  criminal prosecution  or  in a  civil  suit in
which some other law provides a right to sue.'°  This is an unlikely in-
terpretation  of the  treatymakers'  intent.  As noted above,  the  treaty-
makers  have  repeatedly  expressed  concern  about  the  litigation  and
uncertainty  that would result if the human  rights treaties applied  di-
rectly as U.S. law. °6  Moreover, on a number of occasions, the execu-
tive  branch  and  the  Senate  have  expressly  stated  that  the  non-self-
execution  declarations would preclude all judicial enforcement of the
treaties."7  In  this  light,  there  is  little  basis  for  inferring  that  the
1-4  See International  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ex. C, 95-2):  Hearing  Before the Comm.  of  Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong.  18
(1994)  (testimony of State Department Legal Advisor Conrad Harper);  Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 14 (1991)  [hereinafter  1991 Hearings];
RACE  CONVENTION  REPORT,  supra note 99,  at 25-26  (letter from  Acting  Secretary  of
State Strobe Talbott); ICCPR REPORT, supra  note 95, at 19.
1.6  David  Sloss,  The Domestication of International  Human Rights:  Non-Self-Executing
Declarations  and Human Rights Treaties,  24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 129  (1999).
:: See supra text accompanying notes 84, 101-02.
As noted above,  this was the explanation  given in the initial letter of submittal
to President Carter, and it was repeated by State Department officials during the 1979
hearings.  1979 Hearings,  supra  note 80, at 29 (testimony of Roberts B.  Owen, Legal Ad-
viser to  the Department of State)  (explaining that the non-self-execution  declarations
"mean that further changes in our laws will be brought about only through the normal
legislative  process"); id. at 54  (response by the Department of State to a critique of the
reservations  by  the  Lawyers  Committee  on  Human  Rights)  ("A  non-self-executing
treaty may be applied by our courts only through domestic  laws implementing its pro-
visions.").  It also  was repeated in  subsequent letters  of submittal, reports  from  the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and statements in hearings.  See, e.g.,  1991 Hear-
ings, supra note 104, at 80 (written answers by Bush administration)  (stating that non-
self-executing  treaties do not "create directly enforceable  rights absent implementing
legislation"); TORTURE CONVENTION REPORT,  supra note 99, at 12  (explaining that the
non-self-execution  declaration  would  "clarify  that  the  provisions  of the  Convention
would not of themselves become effective as  domestic law"); Marian Nash  Leich,  Con-
temporary  Practice  of the United States Relating  to International  Law:  Human  Rights, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 806, 807  (1988)  ("With  such a declaration,  the provisions  of the Convention
would not of themselves become effective as domestic law."  (citing Memorandum from
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  (May  10, 1988)));  see also GENOCIDE  CONVENTION
REPORT,  supra note 89, at 26  (explaining that the declaration requiring that the Presi-
dent not deposit the instrument of ratification until after implementing legislation has
been  enacted  "reinforces  the  fact that  the Convention  is not self-executing,"  which
means that "no part of the Convention becomes law by itself').
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treatymakers  intended  human  rights  treaties  to  apply  domestically
merely because they emphasized that the treaties  did not create a pri-
vate  cause  of action.  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  courts  have  con-
strued the  non-self-execution  declarations  as precluding  any judicial
enforcement of the treaties.
0 8
Federalism Understandings. RUDs for human rights treaties typically
contain an  understanding  or  other statement relating  to federalism.
The  RUDs  attached  to  the  ICCPR,  for  example,  provide  that  "the
United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by
the Federal  Government to the extent that it exercises  legislative  and
judicial jurisdiction  over the matters  covered  therein,  and otherwise
by the state and local governments."'09  The  Bush Administration  ex-
plained that this understanding "serves to emphasize domestically that
there is no intent to alter the constitutional  balance  of authority be-
tween the State  and Federal governments  or to use the provisions  of
the  Covenant  to  'federalize'  matters now within  the  competence  of
the States.""0  And the Clinton Administration similarly explained that
"[t]here  is no  disposition  to preempt these  state and  local initiatives
or  to  federalize  the  entire  range  of  anti-discriminatory  actions
through  the  exercise  of the constitutional  treaty power....  In some
areas, it would be  inappropriate  to do so.""'  The federalism under-
standings,  in  other words,  both highlight  and voice  respect for the
United States's federal structure of government.
ICJ Reservations.  U.S.  RUDs,  like  the  reservations  of many other
nations,  also  typically decline  to  consent to  "ICJ  Clauses"  in  the hu-
man rights treaties, pursuant to which claims under the treaties could
be brought against the United States in the International Court ofJus-
tice.1  The United States  attached a reservation  to its  ratification  of
the Genocide  Convention, for example,  stating that "before  any dis-
pute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the ju-
risdiction  of the  International  Court of Justice  under  [Article  IX  of
the Convention],  the specific  consent of the United States is required
108 For several such decisions, see supra note 6.
109  U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra  note 86, para. 11(5),  at S8071.
11  ICCPR REPORT, supra  note 95, at 18.
III  RACE CONVENTION REPORT, supra  note 99, at 24.
112 Like  many nations,  the  United States  is  not currently a  party  to  the  general
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice.  It withdrew its consent to
that jurisdiction  in  1985,  after the  court  held that it  had jurisdiction  to adjudicate
claims brought by Nicaragua  concerning  alleged military activities  conducted  by  the
United States.  BARRY E. CARTER & PHaLLI'  R. TRIMBLE,  INTERNATIONAL  LAw 326  (3d
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in  each  case.""3  The  U.S.  treatymakers  have explained  that  the  ICJ
reservations  are designed "to retain the ability of the United States to
decline  a  case  which  may be  brought  for  frivolous  or  political  rea-
sons."""  They also have expressed  the view that the reservations  will
not significantly  affect the resolution  of disputes  under  the  treaties
"because  the  [ICJ]  has not played an important implementation  role
and  because  the  Convention  provides  other  effective  means ...  for
dispute settlement."""
RUDs are now standard practice for U.S. treatymakers when ratify-
ing human  rights treaties.  Their validity  has been  challenged,  how-
ever, under both international  law and  U.S. domestic  law.  We  con-
sider the international law objections first.
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW
Many scholars have argued that RUDs are inconsistent with the in-
ternational  law  that governs  treatymaking.  In  this  Part, we  explain
why these  objections  are questionable  on  their own  terms.  We also
explain  why the conclusion  usually drawn  from the objections-that
the United States  is bound by  the human  rights  treaties  as if it had
never attached the RUDs-is inconsistent with  fundamental  interna-
tional law principles relating  to state consent.  This Part is addressed
primarily to international lawyers and is somewhat technical in nature;
generalist readers may wish  to skip ahead  to Part III, in which we dis-
cuss the domestic law objections to the RUDs.
We need  to say a word at the outset about the sources of interna-
tional law relevant  to this issue.  The Vienna Convention on the Law
11  U.S. RUDs to Genocide  Convention, supra  note 86, para. I(1),  at S1377;  see also
U.S.  RUDs to Race  Convention, supra  note 86, para. 1(3),  at S14326  (stating that "spe-
cific consent of the United States is required" before any dispute may be submitted to
the jurisdiction of the  ICJ); U.S.  RUDs  to Torture  Convention,  supra note  86, para.
1(2),  at S17491  (reserving  the right to agree to any procedure  for arbitration).  The
ICCPR does not contain an ICJ Clause.
114 RACE CONVENIION REPORT, supra  note 99, at 8.
II  Id.  There  is  relatively  little  controversy  regarding  the  validity  of the  United
States's ICJ reservations.  Indeed, the ICJ itself recently gave  effect to one of these res-
ervations.  In dismissing an action brought by Yugoslavia against the United States for
alleged genocide  in connection  with  the Kosovo  conflict, the  Court noted that "the
Genocide Convention does not prohibit reservations" and that "Yugoslavia did not ob-
ject to  the  United  States  reservation."  Case  Concerning  Legality of Use  of Force
(Yugoslavia v. United States),  1999 I.C.J. 114, 1  24 (June 2),  available  at  http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/iyusframe.htm.  As  a  result, the  Court concluded  that
"the said reservation had the effect of excluding  [the ICJ Clause]  from the provisions
of the Convention in force between the Parties."  Id.
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of Treaties' 1 6 is the primary source of the international law objections
to RUDs.  Unfortunately, the provisions of the Vienna Convention re-
lating  to  reservations  are  vaguely  worded  and  have  provoked  dis-
agreement among commentators  and  inconsistent national interpre-
tations.17  To make matters more uncertain, the United States has not
even  ratified  the  Vienna  Convention.  Many  commentators  believe
that  the  Convention's  terms  are  nonetheless  fully  binding  on  the
United States as  customary international law, which  is the body of in-
ternational law that "results from a general and consistent practice  of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.""8  While this
claim is almost certainly too broad,"" we will assume for present pur-
poses, as have executive branch officials, that the Convention generally
reflects customary international law.1
2 °
We  now  turn to  the  specific  international  law arguments  made
against the RUDs.  Where  examples  are needed, we will refer to the
RUDs  attached  to the U.S.  ratification  of the  ICCPR, which  have  re-
ceived the most attention and criticism.
116  Vienna Convention, supra  note 22, 1155  U.N.T.S. at 331.
17 See  Catherine J. Redgwell,  Reservations to  Treaties and Human Rights Committee
General Comment No. 24(52), 46 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 390  (1997)  [hereinafter Redgwell,
Reservations]; Catherine Redgwell,  Universality or  Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations
to General Multilateral  Treaties, 64 BRIT.  Y.B. INT'L L. 245  (1993)  [hereinafter Redgwell,
Universality].
18  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAw  OF  THE  UNITED
STATES § 102(2)  (1987).
119 Many provisions  of the Vienna Convention,  including  the  articles on  reserva-
dons, did not reflect customary international  law at the time the treaty was drafted.  See
IAN SINcLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION  ON THE LAw OF TREATIES  10-24 (2d ed. 1984).
Moreover, the criteria for inferring customary international  law binding on the United
States from a nonratified  treaty like the Vienna  Convention are  contested.  See,  e.g.,
Bruno  Simma & Philip Alston,  The Sources of Human Rights Law:  Custom, Jus  Cogens,
and General Principles,  12 AUSM. Y.B.  INT'L L. 82 (1992).  Finally, well settled U.S.  prac-
tice departs from  some provisions  of the Vienna Convention,  most notably  its provi-
sions  governing  treaty  interpretation.  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  THE  FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED  STATES § 325 cmt. g  (1987);  DavidJ. Bederman,  Reviv-
alist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,  41  UCLA L. REV. 953, 972  (1994).  As noted below,
a customary international  law rule does not bind nations that have opted  out of the
rule during its formative stage.  See infra  note 124.
120  The  typical  executive  branch  formulation,  as  reflected  in  the  Government's
brief in the Domingues case, is that the Vienna Convention "is  generally considered  to
be consistent with current treaty law and practice as recognized in the United States."
Domingues  Brief, supra note  13,  at  8  n.3;  see  also RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  THE
FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAw  OF THE  UNITED  STATES  pt.  III, introductory  note  (1987);
Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  Before United  States Courts,
28 VA.J.  INT'L L. 281,  298-99  (1988).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
A.  Three Minor  Arguments
We begin with three prevalent, but relatively non-serious, interna-
tional law arguments.  The first is that the RUDs are invalid under Ar-
ticle  27 of the Vienna Convention because  they, in effect, limit U.S.
treaty obligations to the existing requirements of domestic U.S. law.
121
Article  27 provides that a nation cannot "invoke  the provisions  of its
internal law as justification for its failure  to perform a treaty."22  As this
language makes clear, Article 27 prohibits reliance on domestic law as
an excuse for nonperformance of a treaty obligation.  It says nothing
about reliance on domestic law as a justification for not consenting to
a treaty obligation in the first place.  By its terms, then, Article 27 has
no bearing on the validity of RUDs, which do not claim any right of
nonperformance by the United States with respect to treaty provisions
that it has ratified.
The second argument-which  concerns the relationship  between
the RUDs and customary international law-is more complicated, but
no more persuasive.  This argument consists of two claims:  first, that
the  treaty  provisions  with  respect  to  which  the  United  States  has
adopted  reservations  are  already  binding  on  the United  States  as  a
matter of customary international law;  and, second, that it is not per-
missible for a nation to agree to a treaty but opt out of provisions that
are  already  binding  on  that  nation  under  customary  international
law.'23 Neither claim is sound.  As an initial matter, it is unlikely that
the provisions  of the  ICCPR with  respect to which the United States
has attached reservations reflect binding customary international law.
To take what is probably the strongest example invoked  by academic
critics of RUDs, even if there is sufficient  state practice  to support a
LA  Riesenfeld  & Abbott, supra  note 4, at 627; Schabas, supra note 4, at 278 & n.35;
Weissbrodt supra note 4, at 57.  A related argument is that no reservations are allowed
with respect to the "non-derogable" provisions in the treaties.  This argument is a non
sequitur.  The ICCPR does state that some of its provisions are non-derogable-that is,
that these provisions may not be disregarded  even in time of emergency.  ICCPR,  supra
note 10, art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.  That statement, however, simply describes the
binding effect of the provisions  once adopted.  There is nothing in the ICCPR, or in
the concept of non-derogability, that requires nations to agree to particular treaty pro-
visions in the first place.  Cf ICCPR Human Rights Comm., General  Comment 24(52),
52d Sess.,  1382d mtg. 1  10, U.N.  Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6  (1994)  [hereinafter
General  Comment 24(52)]  (noting that "there is  no automatic  correlation  between
reservations  to  non-derogable  provisions,  and reservations  which  offend  against  the
object and purpose of the Covenant").
i-1  Vienna  Convention,  supra note  22, art.  27,  1155  U.N.T.S.  at  339  (emphasis
added).
12-  See General Comment 24(52), supra  note 121, 18; Schabas, supra note 4, at 308.
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customary  international law ban on executing juvenile offenders, it is
likely that the United States has effectively opted out of any such  cus-
tomary international law norm.14
More  importantly, the argument incorrectly assumes that nations
are obligated, when they ratify a treaty, to accept all terms in the treaty
that reflect customary international  law.  There is no basis in interna-
tional law for such a rule.  A nation's attachment of a reservation  to a
treaty  provision is not itself a violation of the provision.  It is simply a
decision  by the nation making the reservation not to bind itself to the
treaty  regime,  and its associated enforcement procedures, with  respect  to
the provision in question.  No one claims that nations have an inter-
national  law obligation to bind themselves  to such treaty regimes  and
procedures in the first instance.  It is not argued, for example, that the
United States would have violated customary international law if it had
declined  to  ratify  the ICCPR altogether.  Nor  is it  argued  that the
United States is in violation of international law for having declined to
ratify  the  Vienna  Convention,  even  though  there  is  widespread
agreement  that at least some  of its  terms  reflect  customary  interna-
tional law.  Since  it is  clear that nations  can  refuse  to ratify a treaty
with terms that are reflective of customary international law, it is diffi-
cult to understand how or why international law would obligate them,
when they do ratify the treaty, to accept the treaty in its entirety.
Moreover,  such  a  requirement  would  have  undesirable  conse-
quences for treatymaking.  Given the amorphous nature of customary
international law, it will often be difficult for nations  to know, when
124 It is well settled that a nation "that has clearly declared its rejection of a norm or
principle of international  law while it was in the process of development is not bound
by it."  HENKIN,  supra note 51,  at 30;  see also RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF THE  FOREIGN
RELATIONS  LAW OF THE  UNITED  STATES § 102  cmL  d  (1987)  (explaining that "a state
that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of develop-
ment is not bound by that rule even after it matures"); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the
Different Drummer:  The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International  Law, 26  HARV.
INT'L L.J.  457 (1985)  (describing the increasingly important  role of persistent objec-
tors in international controversies).  The United States-in its RUDs, communications
with international  organizations  (such as the ICCPR's Human Rights  Committee and
the  Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights),  and other  state  practices--has
clearly declared its rejection of any international law norm outlawing the death penalty
for juvenile offenders.  See Domingues Brief, supra note  13, at 12-14  (detailing various
U.S.  objections to such a rule  of international  law).  Numerous  commentators have
nonetheless argued that the execution  of  juvenile offenders in  the United States vio-
lates customary international  law.  See,  e.g., Joan  F. Hartman,  "Unusual" Punishment:
The Domestic  Effects of International  Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalt), 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 655  (1983); Nanda, supra note 4; David Weissbrodt, Execution ofJuvenile
Offenders by  the United States Violates International  Human Rights Law, 3 AM.  U. J.  INT'L L.
& POLY 339 (1988).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
they ratify a treaty, whether a particular  provision is reflective of cus-
tomary international  law.'2'  A rule  that outlawed  reservations  to  all
treaty  terms reflective of customary  international law would thus cre-
ate substantial uncertainty about the validity of treaty reservations and,
more broadly, about the status of treaty relationships.
The third argument is that RUDs are  improper because they  are
an attempt by the United States to ratify the treaties without undertak-
ing any obligations.  As Professor  Henkin explains, "[b]y adhering to
human  rights conventions  subject  to  these  reservations,  the  United
States, it is charged, is pretending to assume international  obligations
but in fact  is undertaking nothing."'26  It is not clear exactly what the
legal  claim is here.  The  claim cannot be  that the United States has
pledged  insufficient  "consideration"  in  entering  into  these  treaty
commitments, since it is well settled that, unlike U.S. contract law, the
international law governing treaties does not require consideration.
'27
Perhaps the claim is simply that RUDs violate a general duty under in-
ternational law to act in good faith.  There is indeed an international
law principle  relating to good  faith in  the treaty context-pacta sunt
sevmnda.  That principle,  however, simply requires that nations act in
good  faith  in  complying  with  the  treaty  obligations  they  have  ac-
cepted.k'   The pacta  sunt servanda  principle does not entail any duty by
nations to agree to treaty obligations in the first place.
Moreover, whatever its international law basis, the premise of this
third argument-that the  United States has not assumed any interna-
tional obligations under the human rights treaties-is false.  For some
treaties,  most  notably  the  Genocide  and Torture  Conventions,  the
United States has expressly changed its domestic law in order to com-
1.17  See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith,  Customary International  Law as Federal
Common Law:  A  Critique of the Modern Position, 110  HARV. L.  REv.  815,  838-41  (1997);
Phillip  R. Trimble,  A  Revisionist liew of Customary International  Law, 33 UCLA  L.  REV.
665  (1986).
"  Henkin, supra note 4, at 344; see also, e.g., Bassiouni, supra  note 4, at 1179  ("This
duality of legal  standards places  the commitment of the United States  to the interna-
tional rule of law in serious question.").
12  7 SeeVienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 2(1) (a),  1155 U.N.T.S. at 333  (defin-
ing  "treaty" simply as  a written  "international  agreement" governed  by international
law); Jeffrey  L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman,  Economic Analysis of International  Law, 24
YALEJ. INT'L L.  1, 30  (1999)  ("[T]here is no corresponding requirement  [under treaty
law]  for consideration.");  Geoffrey R. Watson,  The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781,
797  (1994)  ("There has never been a doctrine of consideration in treaty law....").
UN  See  Vienna Convention,  supra note  22,  art.  26,  1155  U.N.T.S  at  339  ("Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith."  (emphasis added)).
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ply  with  the  treaty  obligations. 1 29   For  other  treaties,  such  as  the
ICCPR,  the  United  States  has  maintained  that  its  current  human
lights protections satisfy its treaty obligations and has committed itself
not to retreat  from those protections.  In doing so, the United States has
exposed itself to the argument that its current law does not fully satisfy
its treaty  obligations,  an argument that would  not be available  if the
United  States  had not  made  any  international  commitments.  The
United States also has committed itself to submit reports detailing its
compliance  with the treaties,  and it has submitted a number of such
reports.1 30  Its reports  have  in turn  served  as a focal  point for argu-
ments concerning U.S. compliance with  the treaty obligations.!"
129  The United States enacted criminal legislation to implement both the Genocide
Convention and the Torture Convention.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1091  (1994)  (genocide);  18
U.S.C. § 2340A  (1994)  (torture).  In addition, it enacted a broad civil damages remedy
for victims of torture to "carry out obligations of the United States under the United
Nations  Charter and other international  agreements pertaining  to the  protection  of
human rights."  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,  Pub. L. No. 102-256,  106 Stat.
73 (1992).  In  1998, it changed its immigration law to take account of Article 3  of the
Torture Convention, which bars the return of a person to another nation "where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected  to
torture."  United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger
of Subjection  to Torture, 8 U.S.C.  §  1231  (Supp.  IV 1998).  Moreover,  the Clinton
Administration  recently  issued  an  executive  order  designed  to  promote  executive
branch  compliance with  the various human  rights  treaties.  Exec. Order  No.  13,107,
3 C.F.R. 234 (1999).
130  Of the four major human rights treaties ratified by the United States, three  (the
ICCPR, the Torture Convention,  and the Race  Convention)  have  reporting require-
ments.  The United  States has submitted reports  to the monitoring  bodies associated
with each  of these three  treaties.  See United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights,  Treaty Bodies Database, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.  Like many nations,
the United States has not submitted every report that has been due and has not always
submitted its reports on time.  As ofJuly 21,  2000, the United States  had submitted a
total of eleven reports, and five were overdue-a better reporting record  than that of
many other nations.  Id.
For example, these  reports have resulted in arguments, by the relevant human
rights committees as well as by private groups such as Amnesty International  and Hu-
man Rights Watch, that aspects of the U.S.  death  penalty, certain  U.S.  prison  condi-
tions, and U.S. police practices violate treaty obligations.  See, e.g., Elizabeth  Olson, U.S.
Prisoner  Restraints  Amount to Torture, Geneva Panel  Says, N.Y. TIMES,  May 18, 2000, at A12
(detailing U.N. objections to the use of electric stun belts and restraint chairs as viola-
tions of the international treaty against torture); Amnesty International, Annual Report
2000, http://www.amnesty.org  (objecting to the use of the death penalty for  minors,
police brutality, and ill-treatment in prisons);  Human Rights Watch,  World Report 2000,
http://www.hrw.org/vr2k  (citing  practices  such  as  police  abuse,  overincarceration,
conditions in custody, and gay- and lesbian-rights violations).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
B.  The "Object and  Purpose"Argument
We  now  turn  to  the argument  that the  U.S.  reservations  to  the
ICCPR violate the treaty's "object and purpose" and are therefore  in-
valid under Article 19 of the Vienna Convention. 3 2  As we  explain be-
low,  this argument  is  difficult  to evaluate  but probably  is incorrect.
The conclusion  usually drawn from  the  argument is that the United
States should be bound by all of the provisions of the ICCPR, including
provisions to  which  the RUDs  expressly declined consent.  As we  explain,
there is no basis in international law for this conclusion.
Before  proceeding  to  the  analysis,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the
ICCPR's  Human  Rights  Committee  has  embraced  both  the  above
premise and conclusion.  The Committee  has no official power to re-
solve  disputes  or  issue  binding  legal  interpretations.  It is  instead
charged  with  receiving  reports  submitted  by  nations  under  the
ICCPR's self-reporting provisions and issuing "such general comments
as it may  consider appropriate." 3  Nevertheless, it has declared itself
to be the definitive interpreter of whether  or not a reservation  to the
ICCPR satisfies the object and purpose test.'"  And, in two documents,
it has directly  or indirectly raised questions about  the  validity of the
U.S. RUDs.  In 1994, it issued a general comment concerning reserva-
tions to the ICCPR, in which it expressed  "particular concern"  about
"widely formulated reservations which essentially render ineffective all
Covenant  rights which would require  any change  in national  law to
ensure  compliance with  Covenant  obligations." 5  It also  maintained
D., See, e.g., Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 599-603;  Schabas,  supra  note 4, at
285-96; Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 58.  See generay General  Comment  24(52),  supra
note  121  (laying out a framework for assessing reservations to the ICCPR).  Article  19
of the Vienna Convention states  in relevant part that reservations to a treaty are not
allowed if they are "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."  Vienna
Convention, supra note 22, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
i'i'  ICCPR, supra  note  10, art. 40(4),  999  U.N.T.S at 182.  Under Article 41  of the
ICCPR, nations may submit declarations agreeing to have the Committee "receive and
consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party
is  not  fulfilling  its  obligations  under  the  present  Covenant."  Id. art.  41(1),  999
U.N.T.S. at  182.  In addition, nations that have ratified the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR have agreed to have the Committee "receive and consider  communications
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that
State  Party of any of the rights set forth in  the Covenant."  Optional  Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  opened  for signature  Dec.  19,  1966,
art.1,  999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302  (entered into force Mar. 23,  1976).  The United States has
neither submitted a declaration under Article 41 nor ratified the First Optional Proto-
col.
General Comment 24 (52), supra note 121,1  18.
i  Id.  1  12.
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in  that comment that reservations  incompatible  with  the  object and
purpose of the ICCPR normally should be treated as severable, mean-
ing that the treaty  "will be  operative  for  the reserving party  without
the benefit of the reservation."'6  Then, in 1995,  it issued a comment
specifically on U.S. human rights practices, in which it asserted, with-
out analysis, that the U.S. reservations with  respect to the  death pen-
alty violated the  "object and purpose"  of the ICCPR. ' 3'  In short, the
Human Rights  Committee  has effectively  taken the  position that the
United States is bound by the ICCPR's death penalty provisions under
international  law  even  though  it specifically  declined  to  consent  to
them.
To analyze the Committee's  claim, some background  is necessary.
Nations have made reservations to treaties since the end of the eight-
eenth  century. 's  International  law  traditionally  imposed  strict  re-
quirements  on when a state could  make  a reservation  and still  be a
party to a treaty.  In a bilateral treaty, a reservation was like a counter-
offer;  both parties to the treaty had to agree  to every reservation  be-
fore the treaty became valid.  For multilateral  treaties,  the traditional
rule was that a reserving state was not a party to a treaty unless  every
other party to the treaty accepted  the reservation."9  This  traditional
unanimity rule was:
based on the concept of the integrity of the terms of a treaty which had
been freely negotiated by the prospective parties, and it provided an un-
136 Id.  18.
137 Consideration of Reports Submitted by  States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Comments of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, 53d Sess.,  1413th mtg. 1 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995).  Several U.S. officials defended  the U.S. RUDs regarding
the death  penalty  in hearings  before  the  Committee  held in  late March  1995.  See
ICCPR Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting, 53d Sess.,  U.N.
Doc.  CCPR/C/SR.1405  (1995)  (Mar. 31,  1995 hearings); ICCPR Human Rights Com-
mittee,  Summary Record of the 1401st Meeting, 53d  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/SR.1401
(1995)  (Mar. 29, 1995 hearings).
138 The Senate's reservation  to the Jay Treaty in 1794 was the first reservation  to a
bilateral treaty; Sweden-Norway's  reservation  to certain parts of the Act of the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 was one of the first reservations  to a multilateral  treaty.  William  W.
Bishop, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 2 RECUEIL  DES CouRs  249, 260-62  (1961).  Reserva-
tions were "sporadic" during the nineteenth century, but then picked up significantly
at the dawn of the twentieth century, beginning with the many reservations to the 1899
and  1907 Hague  Conventions  on the laws of war.  FRANK HORN,  RESERVATIONS  AND
INTERPRETIVE  DECLARATIONS TO  MULTILATERAL  TREATIES  7  (1988).  For statistics on
the use  of reservations  from  1919 to  1971,  see John  King Gamble, Jr.,  Reservations to
Multilateral  Treaties:  A  Macroscopic View of State Practice,  74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372,  376-83
(1980).
139  SINCLAIR,  supra note 119,  at 54-56;  Draft Convention  on  the Law  of Treaties,
arts. 14-16, reprinted  in 29 AM.J.  INT'L L. 657, 659-60 (Supp. 1935).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
ambiguous answer to the question whether a State which had submitted
an instrument of ratification or accession, accompanied by a reservation,
had become a party to the treaty generally."
With  the expansion of multilateral treatymaking  after World War
II, the unanimity  rule  came  under attack.41  There were  increasing
concerns that the unanimity rule was insufficiently flexible and that it
thwarted  maximum  participation  in  multilateral  treaties,  especially
human  rights treaties.  Such flexibility was thought to be essential for
the  making  of human  rights  treaties  among  an  increasingly  large
number of countries that were politically and culturally diverse.  The
International  Court of Justice  ("ICJ")  embraced  a  more flexible  ap-
proach in its 1951  advisory opinion in  Reservations to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the  Crime of Genocide. 43  The  ICJ  rea-
soned that  the  aim of securing widespread  ratification  of the Geno-
cide  Convention  argued for greater  flexibility with regard  to reserva-
tions.  It explained  that, with  respect  to such  a  treaty,  "one cannot
speak  of individual  advantages  or  disadvantages  to States,  or of the
maintenance  of a perfect contractual balance between rights and du-
ties."'4'  The ICJ therefore held that a reserving state could be a party
to  the Genocide  Convention even if some  parties  to  the Convention
objected  to  the reservation.  The  ICJ  stated, however,  that if a  state
makes a reservation  incompatible  with the object and purpose of the
Genocide  Convention, the state "cannot be regarded as being a party
to the Convention."4
40  UNITED  NATIONS  CONFERENCE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  TREATIES:  FIRST  SESSION,
VIENNA, 26 MARCH-24  MAY 1968, at 113, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 1,  U.N. Sales No. E.
68.v.7  (1969)  [hereinafter U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES]  (Testimony of
Mr. Sinclair);  see also Report of the International  Law Commission to  the General Assembly,
[1951]  2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n  123,  129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1  (stat-
ing  that the unanimity rule  is  "desirable" for maintaining "uniformity in the  obliga-
tions of all the parties to a multilateral convention").
141  Some movement away from the unanimity rle occurred prior to World War II.
Most notably, a more flexible approach to conditions was adopted in  connection with
the  Pan American Union  of the  1930s.  See P.K.  MENON,  AN INTRODUCTION  TO THE
LAW OF TREATIES  34-35 (1992).
142 For example,  the  representative  at the Vienna  Conference  from  the  United
Kingdom, a nation that traditionally supported the unanimity rule, acknowledged that
the  rule "might in modem  times  be a  counsel of perfection,  since  it had been ren-
dered less practicable by the great expansion of the membership  of the international
community in  recent years."  UNTED  NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW. OF TREATIES,
supra note 140, at 114.
14  1951  I.C.J. 15.  The case came to the court at the request of the United Nations
General Assembly.
14  Id. at 23.
145  Id. at 29.
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The Vienna Convention, which was opened for signature in 1969
and entered into force in  1980, embraced  a flexible  approach  to res-
ervations  similar to the one outlined  in the  Genocide Convention deci-
sion.1  Article  19 of the Convention allows a party to formulate a res-
ervation  to a  treaty  unless  "the reservation  is  incompatible  with  the
object and purpose of the treaty." 47  Articles 20 and 21  then establish
rules  for  acceptance  or  rejection  of  reservations,  and  the  conse-
quences  that follow from acceptance  or rejection.  When a contract-
ing nation accepts  another nation's reservation,  the  reserving nation
becomes a party to the treaty in relation to the accepting nation. 4"  A
reservation  is deemed  accepted  by any nation  that does not raise an
objection to the reservation within twelve months of notification or by
the date on which it expressed  its consent to be bound by the treaty,
whichever is later.49  An objection to a reservation  does not preclude
entry into force of the treaty between  the reserving and objecting na-
tion unless the objecting state says so definitively;'1° rather, the provi-
sion to  which  the reservation  relates  is  simply  inapplicable  between .• 151
the  two nations  to the extent  of the reservation.  This flexible ap-
proach,  as  the  United Nations's  International  Law  Commission  has
explained, is designed to encourage widespread participation in treaty
regimes."'
Neither  the Vienna Convention nor the  Genocide Convention deci-
sion provides  much guidance  regarding the  meaning  of the "object
and purpose" test.  The ICJ stated in the  Genocide Convention case that
a central purpose of the Genocide Convention  is that "as many States
146 For a detailed historical  account of the events between  the Genocide Convention
case and the final wording of the Vienna Convention, including  the initial criticism of
the ICJ decision and the eventual acceptance  over the subsequent twenty years that a
more flexible  approach was appropriate, see Redgwell,  Universality, supra note  117, at
250-63.
147  Vienna Convention, supra  note 22, art.  19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.  Article 19 also
states  that reservations  are permitted unless  the treaty prohibits them  or only author-
izes reservations other than the ones made.  Id.
148  Id. art. 20(4) (a), 1155 U.N.T.S.  at 337.
149 Id.  am 20(5),  1155 U.N.T.S.  at 337. 50 Id. art. 20(4)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
5 Id. art. 21 (3),  1155  U.N.T.S. at 337.
152  The International Law Commission, in its comments on the draft terms of the
Vienna Convention,  explained that "a power to formulate  reservations must in the na-
ture  of things tend to  make it easier  for some  States to execute  the act necessary  to
bind themselves  finally to participating in the treaty and therefore tend to promote a
greater measure of universality in the application of the treaty."  Report of the Commission
to  the  General Assembly,  [1966]  2  Y.B.  Int'l  L.  Comm'n  169,  205,  U.N.  Doc.
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as possible should participate."'5 3  This statement, combined with  the
court's holding, supports a flexible approach to reservations to human
rights treaties, but it provides  little guidance  regarding specific  appli-
cations of the "object and purpose" test.  To make matters more  un-
certain, there has been no subsequent judicial analysis of the test un-
der either the Vienna Convention or customary international  law, and
no binding official determination  that a reservation  has  ever violated
the test.
Despite these considerations, it seems unlikely that the U.S. RUDs
violate the human rights treaties'  "object and purpose."  We base this
conclusion in part on the widespread state practice in support of res-
ervations  to human rights treaties.  For example,  approximately one-
third of the parties  to the  ICCPR made reservations  to over a dozen
substantive  provisions."4  Like the United States, many countries con-
ditioned their consent to the treaty in order to conform the treaty ob-
ligations to their domestic laws.k'  France, for example, entered reser-
vations and  declarations ensuring that its ICCPR obligations were  no
more  demanding  than  its  domestic  law  with  respect  to  presidential
power,  military  discipline,  immigration,  appellate  criminal  review,
regulation  of war  propaganda, and  minority rights.  Belgium condi-
tioned its consent to ensure that the ICCPR did not affect its domestic
law with respect to sex discrimination  in the exercise  of royal powers,
the protection  of juvenile  criminal  offenders, various  criminal proce-
dures, freedom of speech, and marriage.  The United Kingdom  gave
its consent on the condition that its domestic law not be affected with
respect to free legal  assistance, spousal equality,  election law, military
"'  Reservations  to  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of the
Crime of Genocide,  1951  I.CJ.  15, 24.  The  ICJ continued:  "The complete exclusion
from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of appli-
cation, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles
which are  its basis."  Id.  The Human Rights Committee  has described the object and
purpose  of the ICCPR in a similarly general way.  See General Comment  24(52),  supra
note 121,17.
The object and purpose of the Covenant is  to create legally binding standards
for human  rights  by defining  certain  civil and  political  rights  and  placing
them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States
which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obli-
gations undertaken.
Id.
4 Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 117, at 393.
'1  The  information  in this paragraph  is drawn  from  the online  United Nations
Treat), Collection,  specifically  the Status  of Multilateral  Treaties  Deposited  with  the
Secretary-General,  at  http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterV/treaty5.asp  [hereinafter Status of Multilateral Treaties].
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discipline, and immigration.  There are many other examples.  As one
commentator  noted,  the  ICCPR  "has... been  the  object  of  some
sweeping  reservations  to  which  few  objections  have  been  made."'6
Furthermore, other human rights treaties, such  as the Convention on
the Elimination  of Discrimination  Against Women  and  the  Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, are even more "afflicted" by reserva-
tions." '7
This state practice suggests that the United States's reservations to
the  human  rights  treaties,  which  were not  substantially different  in
number or scope from those of other nations, do not violate the  ob-
ject and purpose  of the treaties.  The selective  and specific  nature  of
the U.S. reservations  further supports this conclusion.  Consider the
ICCPR, which protects dozens of rights, none of which is specified to
be  central  to the treaty's  purpose.  When  a treaty  protects manifold
rights and declines to prohibit reservations,  it is difficult to conclude
that reservations to  a few of the treaty's  rights violate  its object  and 158
purpose.  By  contrast, the  Genocide  and Torture  Conventions  are
both designed to protect a single, overwhelmingly important right.  If
the United States had ratified  those treaties while reserving  the right
to commit genocide  or torture, the reservations might wel  have vio-
lated the treaties'  object and purpose, for little would remain  of the
obligations under the treaty.'59  This, of course, is not what happened.
The United States accepted  the prohibitions on genocide and torture
and simply attempted,  through  its RUDs,  to  clarify  the  scope  of the
terms to which it was consenting.' 6°
Several  technical  legal  arguments  under the Vienna  Convention
also  support the conclusion  that U.S. reservations  do not violate  the
object and purpose of the ICCPR.  Unlike other human rights treaties,
including  one  of the  optional  protocols  to  the  ICCPR  (which  the
United States has not ratified),  the ICCPR contains no clause exclud-
ing  reservations  and  no reference  to  the  object  and purpose  test.
Only 11  of the 146 nations that are parties to the ICCPR have objected
to the U.S.  RUDs, all on the ground that the reservations violated the
56  Redgwell,  Reservations,  supra  note 117, at 391.
57  Id.
158 Cf Madeline  Morris, Few Reservations About Reservations, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 341,
343  (2000)  ("There  is a difference  between  frustrating  the purposes  of a treaty and
fulfilling some, but not all, of  its purposes.").
159  SeeANTHONYAUST,  MODERN TREATYLAWAND PRAcTcIC  110-11  (2000).
160  See supra  text accompanying notes 95-96.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
object and  purpose of the  treaty.6'  None  of these  objections  came
"within  the  twelve  months  of  communication  of the  U.S.  reserva-
tions.""  Under the  terms of the Vienna Convention,  therefore,  the
U.S. reservations are deemed accepted.1   In addition, none of the na-
tions that objected  to the reservations claimed  that the United States
was not a party to the treaty.  Under the Vienna Convention, then, the
United States  is, at worst, a party  to the treaty and  the provisions to
which the reservations  relate do not apply between  the United States
and the objecting nations.64
Some  commentators  have responded  to these  latter points by  ar-
guing that other nations  do not have the power under international
law to consent to reservations  that violate the object and purpose of a
treaty.  The  Genocide Convention decision does offer some support for
this  argument.  The Vienna  Convention, which supersedes  the  state-
ment of customary  international law in  the  Genocide Convention deci-
sion, is unclear about whether the rules for acceptance  of reservations
in Article 20 apply to all reservations, or only to ones that survive Arti-
cle  19's  object  and  purpose  test.,'  Both  the Vienna  Convention's
I'd  Status of Multilateral  Treaties, supra note 155.  Twelve of the 132 countries that
are parties to the Genocide Convention  have objected  to the U.S. RUDs, 3 of the 119
countries that are parties to the Torture Convention  have objected  to the U.S. RUDs,
and none of the 156 countries that are parties to the Race Convention has objected to
the U.S. RUDs.  Id.  Compare those numbers with the test set forth in the Race Con-
vention,  whereby  a  reservation  will  be  deemed  "incompatible"  with  the  object  and
purpose of the Convention if two-thirds of the parties object to the reservation.  Interna-
tional  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of All  Forms  of Racial  Discrimination,  U.N.
GAOR  3d  Comm.,  20th  Sess.,  Annex,  Agenda  Item  58,  art.  20(2),  U.N.  Doc.
A/RES/2106 (1966),  reprinted  in 5 I.L.M. 350, 365 (1966).  There have been no specific
objections  to  the United  States's non-self-execution  declarations  in connection  with
any of the treaties.  Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra  note 155.
Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 117, at 395.
"  See  Nienna  Convention,  supra  note  22,  art.  20(5),  1155  U.N.T.S.  at  337.
("[U]nless  the treaty  otherwise provides,  a reservation  is considered to have been  ac-
cepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection  to the reservation by the end of a
period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which
it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.").
"  See  Vienna  Convention,  supra note  22,  art.  20(4)(b),  1155  U.N.T.S.  at  337
("[A]n  objection by another contracting State  to a reservation  does not preclude  the
entry into force  of the treaty  as  between the  objecting and reserving States  unless a
contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State.");  id. art. 21(3),  1155
U.N.T.S. at 337  ("When  a State objecting  to  a reservation  has not opposed  the entry
into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State,  the provisions to which
the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States  to the extent of the res-
ervation.").
"' For the International Law Commission's  commentary on the original  draft ver-
sion of Articles  19 and 20, suggesting that the object and purpose  test is not an inde-
20001436  UNIVERSITY OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LA W  REVIEW  [Vol. 149:399
drafting history and the state practice  under the  Convention suggest
that Article 20 applies to all reservations, and thus that the object and
purpose  test is  not an independent bar to other nations'  acceptance
of reservations  under the Vienna Convention.' 6  The Human  Rights
Committee  appears  to agree with  this reading of the Convention  be-
cause,  in explaining  why the failure  by  nations  to  object  to reserva-
tions  to the  ICCPR  did not constitute  an  acceptance  of the  reserva-
tions, it felt compelled to maintain that the Vienna Convention's rules
about tacit  consent to reservations  "are inappropriate  to address  the
problem  of reservations  to  human  rights  treaties." 6 7  These  factors,
taken together,  suggest that  the best reading of the Vienna Conven-
tion and related customary international law is that other nations have
effectively  consented  to  the validity  of the  U.S.  reservations  to  the
ICCPRt 68
Because of ambiguities in the Vienna Convention,  and the lack of
a centralized decisionmaker with authority to determine the validity of
reservations,  there is room for disagreement with this conclusion con-
cerning  tacit acceptance.""  This fact is probably beside the point be-
cause, as discussed above, the U.S. reservations almost certainly do not
violate  the ICCPR's  object and purpose.  But even if one  concluded
that the United States's RUDs did violate the  object and purpose  test
and that the violations were not cured by other nations'  failure to ob-
ject to them, it is clearly incorrect to conclude, as the ICCPR's  Human
Rights  Committee  and others  have,  that the United States  continues
to be bound by the ICCPR, including  ICCPR terns to which it did not con-
sent. °  One of the most established  principles in international law  is
pendent barrier to reservation  acceptance by other nations, see U.N. CONFERENCE  ON
THE LAW  OF TREATIES,  supra  note 140.  In subsequent negotiations, many nations pro-
posed  amendments to the Vienna Convention  to  clarify  that the object and  purpose
test was an absolute bar to reservations, but these amendments were  all rejected.  See
Redgwell,  Universality,  supra note 117, at 257-60.
On the drafting history of the Vienna Convention and state practice concerning
reservations, see Redgwell,  Universality,  supra  note 117, at 273-78.
167 General Comment 24(52), supra note 121,1  17.
16  At the very least, the drafting history of the Vienna Convention,  as well as sub-
sequent state practice, suggest that as a matter of customay international  law arising from
the Vienna Convention, the object and purpose  test is not a bar to reservations  inde-
pendent of a nation's consent to the reservations.
169  This issue  is more complex  than our already complicated  discussion suggests.
For an overview of the debate regarding the legal effect of reservations that are incom-
patible with the object and purpose  of a  treaty, see AUST,  supra note  159,  at 105-30;
Red gwell,  Universality, supra  note 117, at 263-69.
See General  Comment 24(52),  supra note 121,  1  18  (concluding that a  reserva-
tion that violates  the object and purpose test "will generally be severable, in the sense
that the Covenant will be operative for the [United States] without benefit of the res-CONDITIONAL CONSENT
that "in treaty relations a state cannot be bound without its consent."''
It would contravene this fundamental principle of international law to
invalidate a reservation to a treaty but hold the party to the remainder
of the treaty without recognizing the reservation"  This conclusion  is
especially clear where,  as with the  U.S.  ratification  of the ICCPR, the
reservations  are  "integral  parts  of its  consent  to be  bound."'"  The
United Nations's  International  Law  Commission  recently  confirmed
this conclusion  and  (along with  several  individual  nations)  expressly
rejected  the  contrary views  of the  ICCPR's  Human  Rights  Commit-
tee.1
7 4
At first glance, it might appear that two decisions  from the  Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights support the Committee's views.  In these
decisions, the European Court held that reservations to the European
Convention on Human Rights were invalid, and it enforced  the entire
enation").
171  See Reservations  to the  Convention on  the Prevention  and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide,  1951  I.C.J.  15, 21  (May 28);  see also, e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF
THE  FoREIGN  RELATIONS  LAw  OF THE  UNITED  STATES  pt.  I,  introductory note  at  18
(1987)  ("Modern international  law is rooted in  acceptance  by states which constitute
the  system.");  Vienna Convention,  supra note  22,  art. 34,  1155  U.N.T.S.  at 341  ("A
treaty  does not  create  either  obligations  or rights  for a third State  without its  con-
sent.");  LOuIS HENKIN,  INTERNATIONAL  LAw:  POLITICS  AND  VALUES  28  (1995)  ("For
treaties, consent is essential.  No treaty,  old or new, whatever its character or subject, is
binding on a state unless it has consented to it.").
"  See Redgwell,  Universality, supra note 117, at 267  ("It was never the intention  of
the ICJ,  the ILC or the  [Vienna Convention]  that a State should be bound by a provi-
sion to which it had not indicated its consent.").
17- Observations  by  the  United States on General Comment 24, 3 INT'L HUM.  RTS.  REP.
265, 269  (1996)  [hereinafter  U.S. Response]; cf Certain Norwegian  Loans (Fr. v. Nor.),
1957 I.C.J. 9,  66  (July 6)  (separate  opinion ofJudge Lauterpacht)  (arguing that when
an invalid reservation  is an  essential component of a nation's consent to the compul-
sory jurisdiction  of the International Court of Justice,  that nation's entire  consent is
"devoid of legal effect").
171 The United States,  Great Britain, and France  strongly objected  to the  dews  of
the  ICCPR's  Human  Rights  Committee  expressed  in General  Comment  24(52),  in-
cluding its views concerning the proper remedy for invalid reservations.  Observations  by
France  on General Comment 24 on Reservations to the ICCPR 4 INT'L HUM. RTS.  REP.  6, 6-8
(1997);  Observations by  the United Kingdom on  General Comment 24, 3  INT'L  HUM.  RTS.
REP.  261,  261-69  (1996);  U.S. Response, supra note 173, at 265-69.  In a 1997 report, the
United  Nations's  International  Law  Commission  similarly  rejected  a number of the
conclusions in  General Comment 24(52).  Report of the International  Law Commission on
the  Work  of its  Forty-Ninth Session,  U.N.  GAOR,  52d  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  U.N.  Doc.
A/52/10  (1997).  The  tension between  General  Comment  24(52)  and  the require-
ment of state consent ivas  exacerbated  recently when  the Human  Rights  Committee
concluded  that  parties to  the  ICCPR  do not have  the  right  to withdraw  from  that
treaty.  General Comment 26, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.  Comm., 53d Sess., Supp. No. 40,
1 5, U.N. Doc. A/53/40  (1998).
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treaty, including the terms to which reservations were  taken.Y5  These
decisions, however, have little relevance  to the U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR and other global human rights treaties.  In part, this is because
the decisions were premised  on a finding that the countries intended
to  be  bound by  the  European  Convention  regardless  of the  fate  of
their reservations.1
7  By contrast, the U.S. RUDs were  clearly a condi-
tion of U.S. ratification.  More significantly, the European Court was
"not simply applying general principles of treaty law." 78  Instead, it was
interpreting  the particular provisions of the European  Convention in
light of the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument of Euro-
pean public order (ordre public)  .,
'
1
79  These principles do not apply be-
yond Europe and thus cannot supersede  the controlling principles  of
the Vienna Convention and related customary international law.
In sum, if the U.S. RUDs really do violate the object and purpose
of the human rights treaties, and the acquiescence of the other parties
to the treaties has not rectified  this problem, there are only two possi-
ble remedies under international law:  either the United States is not a
party  to  the  treaty  provisions  with  respect  to  which  it has  reserved
(which yields the same result as if the  RUDs were  enforced),  or the
United States is not a party to the treaty at all."'0  Human  rights advo-
cates have argued against the former possibility but they have not, of
175  See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)  (1995);  Belilos v. Switzerland,
132 Eur. Ct.  H.R.  (ser. A)  (1987).
176  In the Belilos case, Switzerland  explicitly conceded  this point  132 Eur. C.  H.R.
at  28;  Council of Europe,  European  Court  of Human  Rights,  Doc. Cour/Misc  (87)
237, 45 (transcript of public hearing, Oct 26,  1987).  See generally  Schabas, supra note 4,
at 319.  In the Loizidou case,  by contrast, the court inferred  this intent.  310 Eur. Cr.
H.RP  at 28; see Schabas, supra  note 4, at 321; see also Elena A.  Baylis, General  Comment 24:
Confronting  the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEYJ.  INT'L L.
277, 302-06 (1999).
177  See supra  Part I.B and text accompanying note 86.
178  Redgwell,  Universality, supra note 117, at 266;  see also Susan  Marks,  Reservations
Unhinged: The Belilos  Case Before the European Court of Human Rights, 39 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 300,  327 (1990)  (analyzing  the Belilos decision and tying it to "structural features
of the [European]  Convention").
179 Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27.
180  By analogy, these are the two possibilities generally available under U.S. law with
respect to the severability of statutory provisions.  If a court finds a portion of a statute
to be invalid, it will generally try to sever the invalid portion and enforce  the remain-
der.  However, if it determines that the statute would not have been enacted in the ab-
sence of the invalid portion, it will decline to enforce  the statute  as a whole.  See, e.g.,
Regan  v. Time,  Inc., 468  U.S.  641,  652-55  (1984)  (plurality opinion);  Champlin  Ref.
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla.,  286 U.S. 210,  234  (1932).  See generallyJohn  Copeland
Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203  (1993)  (tracing the development ofjudicial tests
for determining when a statute should be found severable).
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course, argued in favor of the latter.
In the  early stages  of the international  human  rights movement,
flexibility regarding  reservations  was  viewed  as  necessary  to  achieve
widespread  ratification  of human  rights treaties.  Now that this  goal
has been  achieved, human  rights advocates  have changed their posi-
tion, attacking  the RUDs on the ground that the flexible  approach to
reservations  adopted in the Vienna Convention  is "inappropriate" for
human rights treaties.  Even  more dramatically, it is  claimed that na-
tions can be bound by the very treaty terms to which they declined to
consent.  This  change  of position  by  the  human  rights  community
may reflect  an understandable  effort to  strengthen international  hu-
man rights law, but it is inconsistent with settled principles of interna-
tional law. 8'
III. DOMESTIC  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the  last Part, we explained  why  the U.S. RUDs  are  consistent
with  customary international law principles of treaty formation.  Even
if the international law objections to the RUDs were more persuasive,
however, they would not provide  a basis for invalidating the RUDs in
U.S. courts.  In a variety of circumstances,  U.S. courts give effect to ac-
tions by political  branch  actors  even if those  actions violate interna-
tional law.  For example, they apply a federal statute even if it violates
customary international  law182 and  even if it conflicts  with  an  earlier
inconsistent treaty.'8 3  Similarly, they uphold executive branch actions
that violate  customary international  law.""  In  these and many other
INI  In Part IV below, we discuss how the change of position may also have undesir-
ablepolicy consequences  for the development of international human rights law.
'  See,  e.g.,  Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d  916, 918  (9th Cir. 1996);  United States v.
Yunis,  924 F.2d  1086,  1090-91  (D.C.  Cir.  1991); Garcia-Mir  v. Meese,  788  F.2d  1446,
1453-54  (11th  Cir. 1986).
1 3 See,  e.g.,  Breard v. Greene,  523 U.S. 371,  376  (1998)  (per curiam);  Chae  Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),  130 U.S. 581,  600  (1889); Whit-
ney  v.  Robertson,  124 U.S.  190,  194  (1888);  Edye  N%  Robertson  (The  Head  Money
Cases),  112 U.S. 580, 597-99  (1884).
IX4 See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441,  1451  (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert
v. Attorney Gen.,  988 F.2d  1437, 1447-48  (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir,  788 F.2d at 1454.
But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505  F. Supp. 787  (D. Kan.  1980),  affd on other  grounds
sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,  654 F.2d 1382  (10th Cir. 1981).  The rela-
tionship  between  treaties  and  the executive  branch  is  less  clear.  It is  possible  that
courts will apply self-executing treaties to restrict executive branch action in some cir-
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contexts, U.S. courts follow a dualist approach  to the relationship be-
tween  international  law  and  domestic  law:  They  treat  international
and domestic  law as distinct, they rely on domestic  law to determine
international law's status within the U.S. legal system, and, in case of a
conflict,  they generally  give domestic  law primacy  over international
law.'85
Consistent with  this dualistic  approach,  U.S. courts  are  likely to
judge the legal validity of the RUDs ultimately by reference to domes-
tic constitutional law.  In recognition of this point, critics have argued
that the RUDs are inconsistent with  constitutional principles relating
to separation of powers,  the Supremacy Clause, the treaty power, and
federalism.  In  this  Part, we  explain  why  these  constitutional  argu-
ments  are  unpersuasive.  We begin,  however, with  some  general  ob-
servations concerning  the nature  of judicial review  in the context  of
the RUDs.
A.  Judicial  Review
Critics  of the  RUDs argue for extraordinary judicial  intervention
into the treaty process.  Consider the Domingues case, in which the pe-
titioner argued that Nevada's  death penalty for juvenile offenders vio-
lated Article  6 of the ICCPR. 6  For the petitioner  to prevail,  a U.S.
court would  have had  to invalidate  the  treatymakers'  reservation  to
Article 6; determine that the United States was nonetheless still bound
by the entire treaty, including the provision to which it declined con-
sent;  disregard  the non-self-executing  declaration;  and  hold that the
entire treaty, including the  provision  to which  the United States did
not consent, thereby applied  to preempt Nevada law.  To state  these
claims is to understand why courts are not likely to engage in the ag-
gressive forms ofjudicial review needed  to credit them.
U.S.  courts  have never  exercised judicial  review  to  invalidate  ei-
ther the domestic or international effects of a treaty on structural con-
stitutional  grounds.  In part, this is because  the  text of the Constitu-
cumstances.  Cf. United States v. Alvarez-Machan,  504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992)  (assuming
that executive branch  violation of a self-executing  extradition  treaty would  provide a
basis for dismissing a criminal prosecution).  The validity of the President's termination
of a treaty, however, may be nonjusticiable.  Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,  1002-03
(1979)  (plurality opinion).
18 See generally Curds  A. Bradley, Breard,  Our Dualist Constitution, and the Interna-
tionalist Conception, 51  STAN.  L.  REV.  529,  530-31  (1999)  (explaining  differences  be-
tween "monist" and "dualist" approaches to the relationship between international and
domestic law).
186  See supra  text accompanying notes 7-13.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
tion is  relatively  silent  about the  treatymaking  process.  As  Hayden
notes, the Treaty Clause's "elasticity in details" left "to successive Sen-
ates and to successive Presidents the problem and the privilege of de-
termining under the stress of actual government  the precise manner
in which they were  to make  the treaties of the nation." 1 8 7  U.S. courts
also  have  recognized  that,  although  treaties  are  legal  instruments,
their creation and  especially their enforcement are heavily informed
by political  factors.' 8  These  attributes  of the treaty power,  taken  to-
gether, have resulted in numerous practical  and sometimes changing
accommodations  among the  treatymakers  (some of which  have pro-
voked  disagreement)  about  how  treaties  are  made,  enforced,  and
terminated.  Examples  include the particular procedures  for making
treaties, '9 the rise of congressional-executive  agreements  as a substi-
tute  (or  near-substitute)  for  treaties,19 0  and  the  power  to  terminate
treaties,
T M  none of which is addressed by constitutional  text, and all of
which have developed  in particular ways as a result of the contingen-
cies of domestic and international politics.
Recognizing  the lack of textual  guidance  and the  importance  of
political  contingency in this context, U.S. courts have taken a largely
passive role in the institutional developments concerning  the making
and enforcement  of treaties.  They usually defer to  the  accommoda-
tions of the  political branches  (such as with the rise of congressional-
executive  agreements)1
92  or  abstain  from  adjudicating  disputes  be-
tween  the  political  branches  (such as  over  the  termination  of trea-
ties).'  Similarly, they consider many matters pertaining to the nego-
7 HAYDEN, supra note 26, at 2.
See, e.g.,  The Head Monty Cases, 112 U.S. at 598 ("A treaty is primarily a compact
between independent nations.  It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.").
'  HENTUN,  supra note 24, at 177-78.
,  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE  UNITED
STATES  § 303  cmt. e  (1987)  ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive
agreement  can be  used  as  an  alternative  to  the  treaty  method in  every  instance.");
HENKIN,  supra note 24,  at 217  ("[I]t is  now widely accepted  that the Congressional-
Executive agreement  is available for wide use,  even general  use, and is a complete  al-
ternative to a treaty  .... " (citations omitted)).
HENmN,  supra  note 24, at 211-14.
'"z  See generally Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D.
Ala.  1999)  (rejecting  a  constitutional  challenge  to  the  North  American  Free  Trade
Agreement); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA  Constitutional?,  108 HARV. L.
REV.  799  (1995)  (evaluating  the constitutionality  of international  accords  reached as
congressional-executive  agreements).
",t See Goldweater  v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002  (1979)  (plurality opinion)  (express-
ing the view of fourJustices that the President's constitutional authority to terminate a
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tiation,  observance,  and  status  of treaties to  be  "political questions"
committed  to  the  discretion  of the  political branches.1
4  They  also
give  "great weight"  to  the  executive  branch's  interpretation  of  a
treaty. 9'  And,  of  course, judicial  deference  to  political  branch  ar-
rangements  is  especially  strong  in situations,  as  with  the  RUDs,  in
which  the  political  branches  all  agree  on  the  assertion  of constitu-
tional power.""
With  these  points in mind, we now  turn  to the  specific  constitu-
tional arguments made by critics of the RUDs.
B.  Separation  of  Powers
Some commentators have suggested that the RUDs violate separa-
tion of powers  principles.
97  There  are  several  related  claims  here.
One is  that the RUDs  may infringe  on the  President's constitutional
prerogatives in making treaties.  Another is that RUDs are "antimajori-
tarian" because they allow a minority  of senators  to force  limitations
on  treaties  through  their  power  to  block  the  two-thirds  advice  and
consent needed for ratification.' 98  Yet another is that the RUDs  con-
stitute an improper "line-item veto" because  the Senate is in effect try-
ing to change the terms  of the treaty.99  Finally, some commentators
have claimed  that the RUDs improperly interfere  with the role of the
judicial branch in interpreting treaties.
treaty is a nonjusticiable political question).
Edwin  D.  Dickinson,  Editorial  Comment, International  Political  Questions in  the
National Courts, 19 ANI.J.  INT'L L. 157,  161 & n.17 (1925)  (citing cases and examples).
195  United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369  (1989); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
v. Avagliano,  457  U.S.  176,  184-85  (1982);  Kolovrat  v.  Oregon,  366  U.S.  187,  194
(1961);  see  also RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE
UNITED  STATES  §  326(2)  (1987);  Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron  Deference and Foreign Af-
fairs,  86 VA. L. REV. 649, 701-07 (2000).
196  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).  The opinion notes:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from
Congress, he exercises  not only his powers but also  those  delegated by Con-
gress.  In such a case the executive  action "would be supported by the strong-
est of presumptions and the widest latitude ofjudicial interpretation, and the
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."
Id.  (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343  U.S. 579, 637  (1952)  (Jack-
son, J., concurring));  cf  HAYNES,  supra note 21,  at 608  ("No President  has ever taken
the ground that the Senate's  right to amend  treaties  is not included in the power to
reject or to ratify.").
97  See, e.g., Damrosch, supra  note 4; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4.
98  Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra  note 4, at 600-01.
19 John  Quigley, The Rule of  Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45  CATH.  U. L.
REV.  1213,  1233-34  (1996).  This argument was  also made in the Domingues case, dis-
cussed above.  See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
Separation  of powers  claims  are  often  difficult to  assess because
there is no  settled understanding  of the proper  relationship  among
the three branches of the federal government.  Regardless of whether
one views these matters from a formalist or functionalist perspective,
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however, the various arguments made against RUDs under the rubric
of separation of powers  are unconvincing.  This is  especially true, we
hope  to show, when  one descends from abstract concerns  about de-
mocracy and executive  power, and attends to the concrete terms and
structure of the Constitution.
Most of the separation of powers claims against the RUDs relate to
the separation between the legislative and executive branches.  There
are  three fundamental problems with these  claims.  First, the factual
supposition  underlying  the  claims-that  the  Senate  "imposes"  the
RUDs  on  an  otherwise  unwilling  President-is  simply  false.  As  dis-
cussed  above,  RUDs to human rights treaties  all have been  proposed
by presidents in the first instance  rather than by the Senate, and they
are  often adopted by the Senate  without change.  The Senate some-
times  revises proposed presidential  RUDs, but always  in cooperation
with the Executive  Branch, always  in a modest way, and sometimes  in
the direction  of narrowing the scope of the RUDs.Y  Even  if RUDs
could,  in  theory, constitute  interference  with  presidential  power,  a
point that we contest below, interference  is not an issue in the area of
human rights RUDs, where the President and Senate have worked to-
gether.
Second, even if the Senate attached RUDs unilaterally, the  RUDs
would not in any way bind the President.  The Senate  is required  to
attach  the RUDs  before,  and not after, ratification, ° 2  and the  Presi-
For a description of these perspectives,  see Rebecca  L. Brown,  Separated Powers
and Ordered Liberty, 139  U.  PA. L.  REv.  1513,  1522-31  (1991); Thomas NV.  Merrill,  The
Constitutional  Principle of Separation of Powers,  1991  SUP.  CT.  REv.  225,  227;  Peter  L.
Strauss, Fornal and Functional  Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish In-
consistency?,  72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).
j,,l  For  example,  when  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  ultimately  en-
dorsed the Torture Convention, it noted that the RUDs were "the  product of a coop-
erative and successful negotiating process between the executive branch, this commit-
tee,  and interested  private groups."  REPORT  OF THE  COMM.  ON  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,
CONVENTION  AGAINST  TORTURE  AND  OTHER  CRUEL,  INHUMAN  OR  DEGRADING
TREATMENT  OR PUNISHMENT,  S.  ExEc.  REP.  No.  101-30,  at 4 (1990).  Of course,  this
cooperation  takes  place  against  the background  of the  Senate's  potential  threat  of
nonconsent, a point that we discuss below.
See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States,  183 U.S.  176, 180  (1901)  ("The
meaning  of the  treaty  cannot be  controlled  by subsequent  explanations  of some  of
those who may have voted to ratify it.");  id. at 183 (Brown,J., concurring)  ("The Senate
has no right to ratify the treaty and introduce new terms into it, which shall be obliga-
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dent is never obligated to accept the RUDs.  If he disagrees with them,
he can simply refuse  to ratify the  treaty, as several  presidents have  in
fact done  (outside of the human rights context).2"  This distinguishes
RUDs from a true line-item veto, in which one branch,  the Executive,
is attempting to bind another branch,  Congress, to some parts  of the
legislation while vetoing other parts.  It also  distinguishes them from
the line-item veto and one-house  veto provisions that have been held
invalid by the Supreme Court.  The Court held those veto provisions
to  be  invalid  because  they  constituted  attempts  by  one  branch  or
house of the legislature to alter already-enacted  law.
2 4  RUDs  do not
alter already-enacted law.  Rather, they are analogous to a bill passed
by both Houses of Congress and sent to the President for his approval
or veto.  The last constitutional  actor in the process-the President-
retains the discretion to sign the bill despite disagreement with its con-
tent, or to veto the bill because of disagreement with its content.  The
President  plays  a  functionally  identical  role  with  respect  to  Senate
conditions.  In neither case  does he have sole discretion to make fed-
eral law, but in both cases he has the final say about whether federal
law is made. °5
Third, RUDs  attached  by the  Senate  are  not "undemocratic"  or
"antimajoritarian"  in  a constitutionally  meaningful  sense.  It is  true
that a minority of senators can insist on a package  of RUDs as  a pre-
condition  of senatorial  consent to  the treaty.  But  this  power flows
from Article II, which requires two-thirds  senatorial consent  as a pre-
condition to making treaty commitments.  In other words, the minor-
ity power of conditional  consent is a direct consequence of the Consti-
tution's particular super-majoritarian  treatymaking procedure.  This is
but one of many devices in the Constitution  designed  to protect mi-
tory upon the other power.  . . ."); N.Y. Indians v. United States,  170 U.S. 1, 23  (1898)
(refusing to give  effect to a treaty proviso  adopted by the Senate because "there is  no
evidence that it ever received the sanction or approval of the President").
203  For example, President Taft declined  to ratify arbitration  treaties  with France
and  Great  Britain  after  the  Senate  insisted  on  certain  reservations.  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF THE FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  § 303 reporters'  note
3  (1987).
204  See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447  (1998)  (invalidating Line Item Veto
Act because, unlike other statutes, "this Act gives the President the unilateral power to
change  the  text of duly  enacted  statutes");  INS  v.  Chadha,  462  U.S.  919,  952,  956
(1983)  (invalidating one-House veto because "the House took action that had the pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons").
205  Except, of course, that the Senate cannot override the President's refusal  to rat-
ify in the treaty context.  In  this regard  the Senate  has less authority vis-A-vis  the Presi-
dent in  the treatymaking  process  than the House  and Senate have vis-a-vis  the Presi-
dent in the domestic lawmaking process.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
nority interests.'"6
One might argue that the original reasons for the Senate's minor-
ity veto-to  create  a structural  bias against international  agreements .• 207
and to protect state prerogatives '-are  no longer valid.  This is not a
view that we, or any branch of the federal government, share.  In any
event,  this  argument  has little  purchase  in  the  context of RUDs at-
tached  to  human  rights  treaties.  In  this  context,  Congress and the
President remain free to enact a subsequent statute that contains  do-
mestic human  rights protections without the limitations contained in
the  RUDs.2 "  This later-enacted  statute, which a minority of senators
would have no power to block,"9  would, as a matter of U.S. domestic
law, supersede any prior inconsistent provisions of the treaty.
21
0
Finally, there is no merit to the claim that the  RUDs infringe  on
the constitutional  role of the judiciary.  It is  true that the  RUDs are
designed  in  part to  affect  the judiciary's  interpretation  and applica-
tion of the treaties in question.  It is well settled, however, that the po-
litical branches,  by virtue of their lawmaking powers,  have significant
influence  over the judiciary's interpretation  and application  of non-
constitutional  law.  Thus,  for  example,  Congress  often  defines  the
terms  in its statutes,  and  there is  no question  that  these  definitions
constitute part of the  law that is to be  applied  by the  courts.  More
broadly,  Congress  influences  the scope of judicial  interpretation  by
controlling the content and form of federal  law.  The RUDs are simi-
larly part of the law created by the treatymakers, and  they are  there-
fore binding on courts in their interpretation and application  of the
treaties.  Unlike  mere  "legislative  history,"  the  relevance  of which  is
controversial  in  the  statutory  interpretation  context,  the  RUDs  are
subjected  to all of the procedural requirements specified in the Con-
stitution.  Nor are  RUDs after-the-fact  efforts  by the Senate or Presi-
dent  to  control judicial  interpretation  of the  treaty,  since  they  are
formulated  prior  to  ratification,  approved  by  both  the  Senate  and
2-. Other constitutional  provisions  designed  to protect minority interests include
the Article I bicameralism and presentment process, the Article II impeachment proc-
ess, the Article V constitutional amendment process, and, of course, the Bill of Rights.
,17  See Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and  President in the Making and Abroga-
tion of Treaties-The Original  Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined,
55 WASH.  L. REV.  1, 33-39  (1979); Rakove, supra note 26, at 236-39.
2-  Of course,  this legislation, like the treaty that it would supersede, must be con-
sistent with the Constitution.
" A minority of senators might have some  ability to block such a statute through
the filibuster power, just as they would have the power to block any other statute.
"1' See supra  note 3 and accompanying text.
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President, and made part of the U.S. ratification documents." '
C.  Non-Self-Execution
Many of the constitutional arguments against the RUDs have been
directed at the non-self-execution  declarations.  These arguments boil
down to two claims:  first, that the declarations violate the terms of the
Supremacy  Clause;  and,  second,  that  they  exceed  implicit  limits  on
the scope of the treaty power.
1.  The Supremacy Clause
The  Supremacy  Clause  states  in relevant  part  that  "all  Treaties
made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under  the  Authority  of the  United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State  shall  be  bound  thereby.""'  Some  commentators  have  argued
that this language mandates  that human rights treaties have the status
of  self-executing  federal  law,  regardless  of the  wishes  of the  U.S.
treatymakers."'  As  Professor Henkin  states, "treaties are  declared  to
be the supreme law of the land ....  [I] t should not require legislative
implementation to convert  [a treaty]  into United States law."214  Hen-
kin concludes that the "pattern of non-self-executing  declarations  [at-
tached  to  human  rights  treaties]  threatens  to subvert  the  constitu-
tional treaty system.
"""
Although  the word  "shall" in the Supremacy Clause  gives  this ar-
gument surface plausibility, the argument becomes doubtful once one
considers  the purposes  of the  Supremacy  Clause  and  its well-settled
application outside the RUDs context.  By its terms, the Clause  obvi-
ously does  make  federal  laws  supreme  over  state  laws.  The  Clause
does not, however, purport to affect  the power  of U.S. lawmakers  to
define the domestic scope of the law they make, either as to the states
or  as to other federal  laws.  In  other words,  the Clause  does not, as
RUDs  critics  would have  it, operate  as  a limit on federal  lawmaking
power.
211 There has been  substantial  debate,  especially in  the  context of arms  control
treaties,  over whether presidents have the power to "reinterpret" treaties after ratifica-
tion.  For examples of some  of the positions in this debate, see Symposium,  Arms Con-
trol Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1351  (1989).  The RUDs to  the human
rights treaties do not implicate this debate.
212  U.S.  CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2:3 See, e.g., Damrosch, supra  note 4, at 527; Henkin, supra  note 4, at 346.
2 4 Henkin, supra  note 4, at 346.
215  Id. at 348.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
Three examples illustrate this point.  First, the  Supremacy Clause
makes  federal  statutes,  like  treaties,  the  supreme  law  of the  land.
Nonetheless, Congress frequently specifies that federal statutes do not
preempt state law, do not invalidate prior federal law, or do not create
a private cause of action. 16  Second, although congressional-executive
agreements-which  are  equivalent  to  treaties  on  the  international
plane-are  considered  part  of the  supreme  law  of the  land,2
17  it  is
widely accepted  that Congress  and the  President  can  limit the self-
executing effect of these agreements."8  Third, and most directly rele-
vant, it has  long  been  settled  that, notwithstanding  the  Supremacy
Clause, not all treaties are self-executing. 9
With respect to the last point, critics  of the  RUDs  generally  con-
cede that not all treaties are self-executing.  They argue, however, that
the self-execution  issue  must be  resolved  solely  by reference  to  the
terms of the treaty negotiated with foreign nations, not by conditions
unilaterally imposed  on the treaty by the Senate  or President.  Noth-
ing in the language of the Supremacy Clause or in U.S. historical tra-
dition  suggests that  this is true.  As  noted above,  federal  lawmakers
generally have the  power to limit the domestic  effects  of their enact-
ments, and there is no reason  to believe that the treatymakers  should
216  For  examples  of statutes  with  these  limitations,  see  8  U.S.C.  §  1158(d)(7)
(Supp. 1996)  ("Nothing in this subsection  [concerning  asylum applications]  shall  be
construed  to create  any substantive  or procedural  right  or benefit that is legally en-
forceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other
person.");  16 U.S.C.  § 5204 (1994)  ("This chapter does not preempt a State law or lo-
cal ordinance that provides for civil or criminal penalties for conduct that violates this
chapter.");  18  U.S.C.  § 38  (2000)  ("This  section  does  not preempt  or displace  any
other remedy, civil or criminal, provided by Federal or State law for the fraudulent im-
portation, sale,  trade,  installation,  or introduction  into  commerce  of an  aircraft  or
space vehicle part.").
07 RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS  LAW OF THE  UNITED STATES
§ 111  (1987).
A  See, e.g.,  HENKIN,  supra  note 24, at 217 n.**; Damrosch, supra note 4, at 525-26;
Riesenfeld  & Abbott,  supra note  4,  at  641.  For  example,  in  the  Uruguay  Round
Agreements  Act, which authorizes  the  latest GATT  agreement,  Congress  stated that:
"No  provision  of any of the Uruguay Round  Agreements,  nor the application  of any
such  provision to any person or circumstance,  that is inconsistent with any law  of the
United  States  shall  have  effect."  Pub.  L.  No.  103-465,  §  102(a) (1),  108  Stat.  4809
(1994).  Congress also stated that no one other than the United States "shall have any
cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements" or challenge
"any action or inaction ...  of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision
of a State  on the ground that such action  or inaction is  inconsistent" with one of the
agreements.  Id.  §  102(c)(1).
•  Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288  (1902); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S.  (2 Pet.)
253,  314  (1829),  overruled in part ly  United  States v.  Percheman,  32 U.S.  (7  Pet.)  51
(1833).
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have less  power in this regard.  Moreover,  it has long been accepted
that, for separation of powers  reasons,  certain  treaties, such  as those
that declare war, create  criminal  liability, appropriate  money, or im-
pose taxes, are non-self-executing regardless  of their  terms. 22 0
In any event, even if it were true that the  issue  of self-execution
had  to be determined  solely by reference  to the terms of the  treaty,
the United States's non-self-execution  declarations are in fact part of
the terms  of the treaties.  They are  included within  the  U.S. instru-
ment of ratification  that defines the nature of the  U.S. obligations  to
other countries, and all other parties  to the  treaties  are on notice of
them. 22  Moreover, unlike some of the United States's substantive  res-
ervations, no nation has specifically objected to the non-self-execution
declarations.  It would be difficult for any nation to do so since many
nations'  constitutions  render  all  treaties  non-self-executing  and  re-
quire separate  implementing  legislation  for the  treaties  to have  do-
mestic force.  Thus, even if the treatymakers  could control the domes-
tic scope  of a  treaty  only by including  limitations  within  the treaty
itself, a point for which there is no support, that is precisely what the
non-self-executing declarations accomplish.
Critics of the RUDs sometimes quote from early historical materi-
als to the effect that the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy  Clause
was  designed  to  reduce  treaty  violations  attributable  to  the  United
States.  They argue  that non-self-execution  declarations  may contra-
vene  this purpose by heightening the risk that the United States will
violate international law.22 2  None of this historical  evidence, however,
suggests that the Supremacy Clause was meant to limit the treatymak-
ers'  control over the domestic force of treaties.  Rather, it shows only
that the Framers wished to give the national government the power to
220  See,  e.g., The  Over  the  Top, 5  F.2d  838,  845  (D.  Conn. 1925);  RESrATEMENT"
(THIRD)  OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS  LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111  reporters'  note
6 (1987); CRS STUDY, supra note 15, at 48-49.
221  This is a point that has consistently been emphasized  by the Senate and various
presidential administrations.  See, e.g.,  1979  Hearings,  supra  note 80, at 40  (statement of
Jack Goldklang, Department of Justice);  GENOCIDE  CONVENTION REPORT,  supra note
89, at 16-17.  The fact that the RUDs are included within the U.S. instrument of ratifi-
cation distinguishes them from, for example, the twenty-eight "conditions" adopted by
the  Senate in connection  with its  approval  of the  Chemical Weapons  Convention,  a
treaty that expressly disallows reservations.  Resolution of Ratification for the Chemical
Weapons Convention,  S. Res. 75,  105th Cong.,  143  CONG.  REC.  S3651  (daily ed. Apr.
24, 1997)  (enacted).
=  See, e.g.,  Halberstam, supra note 4, at 58; Carlos Manuel Vdzquez,  The Four  Doc-
trines of Self-Executing Treaties,  89 AM.J. INT'L L. 695, 716-17 (1995).CONDITIONAL CONSENT
prevent treaty violations  by U.S. states if they so desired. 223  The inclu-
sion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, in other words, was designed
to  enhance  the  ability  of the  federal  government  to  compel  state
compliance  with  treaties,  not  to  restrict  the  federal  government's
flexibility  in  determining whether  and  how  to  comply with interna-
tional law.
2.  Scope of the Treaty Power
The second argument made against the non-self-execution  decla-
rations is that even if they do not violate the Supremacy Clause,  they
exceed the scope of the treaty power.  Here it is argued that Article  1I
only allows  the  treatymakers  to  make  "Treaties,"  and  that non-self-
execution declarations are not encompassed  within that term.  These
declarations,  the argument  goes,  concern  only the  domestic  imple-
mentation  of the treaty  and  thus  are  not part of the  international
agreement  itself."
11  As  Professors  Riesenfeld  and Abbott  put it, the
Senate "does not have  a constitutionally mandated power  to unicam-
erally adopt rules applicable to the United States or its citizens merely
because the Senate purports to act under the treaty power.,2
0
There  are a number of problems with  this  argument.  As  noted
above,  the RUDs  are approved  by the Senate and President  together
and thus are not unicamerally  imposed by the Senate.  Moreover, the
non-self-execution  declarations  are  included  within  the  U.S.  instru-
ment of ratification,  and other nations are therefore  on notice of the
declarations  and have an opportunity  to object to them.  As a result,
they  do  in  fact  form  part  of  the  international  agreement-the
"Treaty,"  to  use  the  term  in  Article  I--entered  into  by  the  U.S.
treatymakers.
To the extent that critics  of the RUDs are arguing that the treaty-
Y  For documentation  of this point, see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original  Understanding,  99  COLUM. L. REv.  1955, 1955
(1999), andJohn C. Yoo, Treaties and  Public  Lawmaking. A  Textual and Structural  Defense
of Non-Self-Execution, 99  COLUM.  L. REv.  2218, 2218  (1999).  See also THE FEDERALIST
No. 22, at  151  (Alexander Hamilton)  (Clinton Rossiter ed.,  1961)  (noting that, under
the Articles of Confederation, "[t]he  treaties of the United States ...  are liable  to the
infractions  of  thirteen  different  legislatures");  1  THE  RECORDS  OF  THE  FEDERAL
CONVENTION  OF  1787, at 316  (M. Fan-and ed.,  1911)  (noting concern by James Madi-
son regarding "[t]he tendency of the States  to  these violations" of the law of nations
and treaties).
224  See, e.g., Dearborn,  supra note 4, at 239-44;  Halberstam, supra note 4, at 68-70;
Quigley, supra note 4, at 1303-05; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 590-600.
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra  note 4, at 589.
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makers  lack  the power  under Article  II  to include  treaty conditions
that are "domestic" in nature, their argument proves too much.  If the
treaty power  did  not  encompass  "domestic" matters,  human  rights
treaties,  and not just their non-self-execution  declarations,  would  be
suspect.  These  treaties  regulate  the  internal  relationships  between
governments  and their citizens.  Moreover, as international  tribunals
have recognized,  these  treaties  do not impose reciprocal  obligations
226 in any meaningful  sense.  For these reasons,  a number of interna-
tional law scholars, as well  as the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the  United States, have  denied that  there  is  any "interna-
227 tional" subject matter requirement for the treaty power.
Critics of the RUDs have not disputed this general proposition; in-
stead,  they  claim that the  treatymakers  in  effect  have  the  power  to
make  treaties on any subject but no  power whatsoever  to determine
the treaties' domestic effects.  There is nothing in the Treaty Clause or
constitutional  practice under it that suggests such an unlikely distinc-
tion.  The treaty power has a dual nature-it is a power to make inter-
national agreements,  but it is  also a power  to make supreme  federal
law. Just as Congress's Article I powers to make legislation include the
power to limit the effect of the legislation in U.S. courts, so too should
the treatymakers'  Article  II powers  to make  treaties be  construed  to
228 include  the power of domestic limitation.  Indeed, under the  non-
self-execution  doctrine,  it is already  well  established  that the  treaty-
makers  can  control  domestic  implementation  by agreeing  to  treaty
terms  that  are  not  in  themselves  self-executing.  The  non-self-
execution  declarations are simply treaty terms that achieve this result
more generally.
Support for this conclusion  comes from the practice  of congres-
sional-executive  agreements.  As mentioned above, non-self-execution
226  For example, as noted above, the International Court of  justice has stated that
with human  rights treaties,  "one cannot speak of individual  advantages or disadvan-
tages to states, or of the maintenance  of a perfect contractual  balance between  rights
and duties."  1951 L.CJ. at 23; see supra  note 144 and accompanying text.  Similarly, the
ICCPR's Human Rights Committee has stated that human rights treaties "are not a web
of inter-State  exchanges of mutual  obligations" and that the "principle of inter-State
reciprocity has no place" in this context.  General  Comment 24(52),  supra note  121,
i  17.
227  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 302 reporters'  note 2 (1987);  HENKIN,  supra  note 24, at 197-98.
228  Cf  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF THE  UNITED
STATES § 303  reporters' note 4  (1987)  (explaining that the attachment of a non-self-
execution  declaration  by  the Senate "is  an expression  of the Senate's  constitutional
authority to grant or withhold consent to a treaty").CONDITIONAL CONSENT
declarations can be attached to congressional-executive  agreements.2 9
This shows  that nothing inherent in the power to make international
agreements  precludes  control  over  the  domestic  scope  of  these
agreements.  In addition, the dramatic increase in the use of congres-
sional-executive  agreements in  place of treaties  has been justified  on
the  ground  that  the  bicameral  process  for  making  international
agreements better reflects majoritarian preferences than does the two-
210 thirds  senatorial  consent  process.  But  this  is  precisely  the  end
served by non-self-execution  declarations,  which  ensure  that  impor-
tant domestic  legal  changes are  implemented through  the bicameral
legislative process.  The non-self-execution  declarations are  thus justi-
fied by the same majoritarian aims that support the interchangeability
231 of congressional-executive agreements and treaties.
D.  Potential  Limits
We do not mean  to suggest that there  are no limitations on  the
conditional consent power of the President and Senate.  Presumably,
the conditional  consent power is subject, like  the treaty power more
generally, to  the individual  rights protections  in  the  Bill of Rights.23 2
We can  imagine three  additional limitations.  We  do not necessarily
embrace these  limitations; we merely wish  to show that these possible
limitations  would not apply to the conditions imposed in connection
with human rights treaties.
One possible limitation is that the condition must have some rela-
tionship to the treaty.  As the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States argues, "[s]urely, a condition that has no rela-
tion to the treaty would be improper, for example, a requirement that
the  President dismiss or appoint some cabinet officer.,2 33  This limita-
tion is  simply a weak nexus requirement that presumably  attaches to
all exercises  of constitutional  power.2
3  As  the  Restatement (Third) ac-
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
HENKIN, supra note 24, at 217. "3 Although  we  do  not dispute  the  general  constitutionality  of  congressional-
executive agreements,  we  take no position here  on the proper  degree of interchange-
ability between such agreements and Article II treaties.
"  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)
(plurality opinion).
-3-  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE  UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. d (1987).
14  For example, the Supreme Court has held that conditions attached by Congress
in the exercise  of its spending power must have a reasonable relationship  to the pur-
pose of the spending.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08  (1987).
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knowledges,  the  non-self-execution  declarations  meet  this  require-
ment, since they  concern  the  terms and domestic status  of the treaty
in question. 2'
A second possible limitation is that the Senate cannot use its con-
ditional  consent power to  alter pre-existing  federal  law.  This  limita-
tion is suggested by the D.C. Circuit's decision in Power  Authority of New
York v. Federal  Power Commission.23 6  The question there was the validity
of a Senate condition, labeled a "reservation," to a treaty between  the
United States and Canada concerning use of the waters of the Niagara
237 River.  The reservation  stated that "no project for redevelopment of
the United States' share of such waters shall be undertaken  until it be
specifically  authorized by Act of Congress. "2m  The question  in Power
Authority was whether  the reservation  invalidated  the  Federal  Power
Commission's  pre-existing  licensing  authority  under  the  Federal
Power Act of 1920.23'  The D.C. Circuit concluded that the reservation
did not have this effect because, despite its label, it was not intended
by the Senate to be a condition of ratification. 240
In reaching this conclusion, the court suggested that if the Senate
had intended  the statement to be a condition of ratification,  the con-
dition might have been beyond the Senate's powers.
24
'  To the extent
the  court was  insinuating  that non-self-execution  declarations  per se
are  constitutionally suspect, we  disagree for the reasons  already out-
lined above. 242  Our present concern is with a narrower limitation sug-
235  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. d (1987).
22  6  247 F.2d  538  (D.C.  Cir. 1957),  vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as
moot sub nom. Am. Pub. Power Assoc. v. Power Auth., 355 U.S.  64  (1957).
237  Convention  on Uses  of the Waters  of the  Niagara River,  Feb.  27,  1950,  U.S.-
Can., 1 U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130.
2-8  Id. at 699.
239  16 U.S.C.  § 791a-830 (1994).
240  One of the three judges on  the panel dissented,  arguing that  the Senate in-
tended its "reservation" to be a condition of ratification  and that the condition was a
valid exercise  of the Senate's  advice and consent power because it was related to  the
treaty.  Power  Auth., 247 F.2d at 544 (Bastian, J., dissenting).  The dissenting judge also
argued that if the condition were in fact beyond the Senate's powers, the United States
would not be a party to the treaty at all because the Senate would not have given effec-
tive consent.  Id.
241  Id.  at 543.
242  Some  have drawn  this inference from  the court's statement  that the Constitu-
tion might not allow the federal treatymakers  to create binding treaties, or conditions
on treaties, addressing matters of "purely domestic concern."  Power  Auth., 247 F.2d at
543; see Halberstam, supra  note 4, at 69; Quigley, supra  note 4, at 1303-05; Riesenfeld &
Abbott, supra note 4, at 590-600.  For a strong defense of the Niagara reservation's  va-
lidity, see Henkin, supra  note 41; see also  Damrosch, supra note 4, at 527 n.48 (conclud-CONDITIONAL CONSENT
gested  by Power Authority.  The  Senate's  "reservation"  in that case,  if
treated as a binding treaty condition, would have limited  the effect of
a pre-existing domestic statute that, by its terms,  governed  the devel-
opment of the Niagara  River waters.  The court might have believed
that  the  Senate  was  attempting,  through  its  conditional  consent
power, to change  existing law without the involvement  of the  House
of Representatives.2  Assuming that this characterization  of the Niag-
ara reservation is accurate,
24  it is conceivable  that such an exercise  of
the conditional  consent power would exceed  the Senate's  powers un-
der Article II.  On the other hand, longstanding case law suggests that
U.S.  treatymakers  acting together have the  power to override  a prior
inconsistent federal statute,4   so it is not clear why the Senate  cannot
condition  its  consent on such an  effect.  In  any event, such a limita-
tion  would not affect the validity of non-self-execution  declarations,
which are designed  to avoid changing existing law without full partici-
pation of the House. 6
Third, and finally,  the Senate's conditional  consent power might
be limited to the extent that it unduly impinges on the prerogatives of
ing that the reasoning of the PowerAuthority  decision "would probably not be extended
to non-self-executing declarations"); cf Power  Auth., 247 F.2d at 542  (stating that "[t] he
Senate could, of course, have attached to its consent a reservation to the effect that the
rights and obligations of the signatory parties should not arise until the passage of an
act of Congress"  and  that "[s]uch  a reservation,  if accepted  by Canada, would  have
made the treaty executory").
.A  That is precisely how Professors PhilipJessup and Oliver Lissitzayn  characterized
the  issue  in  a brief they submitted  in support  of the  Power Authority.  Opinion  of
Phillip  C. Jessup & OliverJ. Lissitzyn for the Power Authority of the State of New York
(Dec. 1955),  quoted in Bishop, supra  note 138, at 319-20.
i44  Professor  Henkin  contested  that  characterization  of the  Niagara  reservation,
arguing that "[t]he President and Senate have merely refused  to throw new and valu-
able resources  into an old established system of development which Congress may not
have intended and may not now desire."  Henkin, supra note 41, at 1173.
'  See supra note 3.  In truth, although U.S. case law refers to a last-in-time relation-
ship between treaties and conflicting federal statutes, most decisions applying this rule
have involved statutes that override treaties rather than treaties that override statutes.
;1.  Perhaps  the best reading of Power  Authority is that it simply applies an interpretive
presumption against overriding  federal legislation by means of treaty conditions.  If so, it
may be consistent with the general presumption  against repealing  federal statutes by
implication.  See, e.g.,  United States v. United  Continental Tuna Corp., 425  U.S.  164,
168  (1976)  (stating that "[i]t is a cardinal  principle of statutory  construction that re-
peals by implication  are not favored"); Posadas v. Nat. City Bank,  296  U.S.  497,  503
(1936)  (same).  It is  also consistent with what appears to  be a trend in  recent lower
court  decisions  towards  a  presumption  against  interpreting  treaties  to  be  self-
executing.  Goldstar (Panama) SA.  v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968  (4th Cir. 1992);
More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1992); Frolova v. U.S.S.R.,
761  F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985).  See generally Bradley, supra note 185, at 541  (discuss-
ing this trend).
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the other branches  of the federal government.  By analogy, Article II
gives  the Senate a role in consenting to the appointment of ambassa-
dors, judges, and other officers in addition to its role in consenting to
treaties.  It is possible  that conditions attached  by the Senate to such
appointments-such  as a condition requiring that an appointed judge
vote a certain way, or a condition requiring  that an  ambassador pur-
sue  a  particular  policy with  another  country-would  be  unconstitu-
tional.  If so, it would  be because  the condition  interfered  with  the
constitutional  prerogatives  of another branch, such  as  the independ-
ence  of the judiciary or the executive's  discretion in conducting  for-
eign affairs.  The RUDs to the human rights treaties do not raise such
constitutional  concerns.  As we explained  above, they do not impinge
on the power of the judiciary because they merely determine the con-
tent of the law to be interpreted, a power that federal lawmakers  un-
247 controversially possess.  Similarly, since the conditions concern  only
the  scope  and  content  of treaties-the  ratification  of which  are  the
joint responsibility of the Senate and President-they do not interfere
with whatever sole discretion the executive has over foreign affairs.! 4
E.  Federalism
As noted, the package of RUDs typically includes a federalism un-
derstanding  that emphasizes  that treaties  do not affect  the  constitu-
tional  balance  of  authority  between  the  state  and  federal  govern-
ments.  Many  commentators  believe  that  there  are  no  federalism
limitations on the treaty power, and therefore they question the need
for  these  understandings.2 49   For  reasons  we  have  articulated  else-
where,  we disagree  with  this view. 
25  The important  issue for now  is
247  See supra  text accompanying  notes 21&19.
248  See supra  text accompanying notes 204-07.
249  See Henkin,  supra note 4, at 345; Weissbrodt,  supra note 4, at 66;  see also Dam-
rosch,  supra note  4, at 530-31  (arguing that  non-self-execution  declarations  are not
needed to protect federalism).
20  As one of us has  explained  elsewhere,  commentators who  view the federalism
understandings  as  unnecessary  may  be  reading  Missouri v.  Holland, 252  U.S.  416
(1920),  more expansively than  is warranted.  Curtis A.  Bradley,  The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MicH.  L. REv. 390,  425-26  (1998).  Although  the Court in Hol-
land suggested that the treaty power was broader than Congress's Article  I powers,  it
did not hold that the treaty power was immune from all federalism limitations.  See 252
U.S.  at 433-34  ("We  do not mean  to  imply that there are no  qualifications as  to  the
treaty-making  power;  but  they must be  ascertained  in a different  way ....  We  must
consider what this country has become in deciding what [the Tenth]  Amendment  has
reserved.").  In any event, Holland was decided before both  the development of mod-
em human rights treaties and the tremendous expansion of Congress's domestic legis-CONDITIONAL CONSENT
not necessity, but rather the legality of the federalism understandings.
The most common  legal  argument made  against  the  federalism
understandings  is that they are inconsistent with  the general liability
of federal nations under international law for the actions of their con-
stituent states.  This principle is reflected in Article  50 of the ICCPR,
which states  that  "It]he  provisions of the present  Covenant shall  ex-
tend  to  all  parts  of federal  States without  any  limitations or  excep-
tions. ' '  This argument is  obviously not  a  domestic constitutional  ar-
gument.  In any event,  the argument is beside  the point because  the
federalism  understandings do not purport to deny the liability of the
United States for the actions of its states.  Rather, the federalism  un-
derstandings  simply  note  that, because  of the federal  nature  of the
U.S. government, some of the treaty obligations may be implemented
at the state  level rather than the federal  level.  As  the Bush Admini-
stration  explained  when it submitted a  federalism  understanding  to
the Senate in connection with the ICCPR, "the intent is not to modify
or limit U.S. undertakings under the  Covenant but rather to put our
future treaty partners on notice with regard to the implications of our
federal system concerning implementation.",
2
In  a  recent  article,  Professor  Carlos Vizquez  attempted  to  use
constitutional federalism  concerns  against  the federalism  understand-
ings.  As he notes, in recent years the Supreme Court has held that the
Tenth Amendment bars  the federal government from "commandeer-
ing" state  governments.'  V;zquez  argues  that if this  anticomman-
deering restriction applies to the treaty power, it might be violated by
the federalism  understandings.2  He observes that the United States
has  an  international  law  duty  to  implement  its  treaty  obligations.
"Thus," he says, "the federalism understanding, alongside the non-self-
executing  declaration,  appears  to  commandeer  state  legislatures  to
lative powers-developments  that might alter the need for, and desirability of, the Hol-
land approach  to  the  treaty power.  This conclusion  finds support  in  the  Supreme
Court's  renewed emphasis  on federalism  limits on  the national government, even  in
the  foreign  affairs  context.  See generally Curtis  A.  Bradley  & Jack L.  Goldsmith,  The
Abiding Relevance of  Federalism  to U.S. Foreign  Relations,  92AM.J. INT'LL. 675  (1998).
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 50, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185.
tcd  ICCPR  REPORT,  supra  note 95, at 18.
V1_  Printz v.  United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144,  149  (1992).
54 Carlos  Manuel  Vzquez, Breard,  Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70  U.  COLO.  L.
REV.  1317,  1354-57  (1999);  cf  Gerald L.  Neuman,  The  Global Dimension of RFRA,  14
CONST.  COMMENTARY  33,  52  (1997)  (noting  possible  tension  between  the  anticom-
mandeering principle and the federalism understandings in the RUDs).
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pass the laws the treaty requires." 255
The  obvious  response  to Vdzquez  is  that  the  federalism  under-
standings are not intended to compel state action.  These understand-
ings, in other words, are not designed to carry out an international law
duty but rather to make a political statement about the federal nature
of the U.S. system.  Vzquez  recognizes this possibility, but he replies
that "if the purpose of this understanding is to make compliance with
these treaties ultimately a matter of the states'  option, then the result-
ing regime is in deep tension with our constitutional scheme."25  It is
in deep  tension with our constitutional  scheme, he says, because it al-
lows for the possibility that some state violations of treaties will not be
prevented by the federal  government.
2
5
7  V;zquez  thus ultimately re-
turns to the argument, discussed above, that the Supremacy Clause is
designed  to  reduce  treaty violations.  The  historical  evidence,  how-
ever, does not show that it was designed to reduce treaty violations  al-
lowed by  the federal  government.2 58  By analogy,  the dormant  Com-
merce  Clause is designed  to reduce state interference  with  interstate
commerce,  but  it does  not preclude  the federal  government  from
authorizing such interference. 259
In any event, Vzquez is wrong to assume that it is the understand-
ings that might make  treaty compliance  "a matter  of the  states'  op-
tion"-the understandings merely highlight the possibility that the fed-
eral structure of the  Constitution may  have  this  effect.  If,  as  some
commentators  argue,  there are  no federalism  limitations  on  the  na-
tional government's  ability to implement treaties,  then the federalism
understandings  are inconsequential.  On the other hand, if there are
federalism limitations on the treaty power, then these understandings
are useful signals to U.S. treaty partners.  In neither scenario are they
unconstitutional.
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CONDITIONAL  CONSENT
We  have tried to show why U.S. RUDs  practice  is consistent with
both  international  law  and  U.S.  constitutional  law.  Critics  of the
RUDs, however, do not rely solely on legal arguments.  Closely tied to
2  Wzquez, supra  note 254, at 1356.
256  Id. at 1357-58.
257  Id. at 1358.
28  See supra  Part III.C.1.
25  See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp,  Inc. v. Bd. of Governors  of the Fed.  Reserve  Sys.,
472  U.S.  159, 174  (1985)  ("When  Congress  so chooses, state actions which  it plainly
authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.").CONDITIONAL CONSENT
their legal objections  is the view that the RUDs practice  is, regardless
of its  legality, bad  policy.  The policy  criticisms  are of two  general
types.  The first concerns  the  message that RUDs  send to the interna-
tional  community.  The  message,  it is  claimed,  is  that  the  United
States does not take  international human  rights law seriously.2 ' °  The
second criticism  concerns  the  effect  this message  has on  the interna-
tional  community.  This effect  is  supposedly  to  undermine  interna-
tional human rights protection."'
As we explain below, these criticisms are misplaced on several  lev-
els.  Perhaps most importantly, they fail to take account of the many
virtues of the RUDs practice.  They also rest on a perfectionist view of
international human rights law, as well as an idealized view of domes-
tic and international politics.  And, ironically, they might well do more
harm  than good  with  respect  to  U.S.  participation  in international
human rights law regimes and, because of the importance  of U.S. par-
ticipation, to the broader human rights movement itself.
A.  Virtues of the RUDs
Human rights treaties-especially treaties  like the ICCPR-have  a
dual nature.  They are in part law-a single legal  text designed to es-
tablish  international  obligations  among  all  of the  countries  of the
world.  And  they  are  in  part aspiration-broad,  universalistic  norms
designed  to  change  national  and individual  attitudes  toward human
rights in the face of substantial variations in culture, political systems,
moral commitments,  and the like.  Given this  dual nature, as  well  as
the heterogeneity of the world community, it is virtually impossible to
reach agreement on a treaty text that is acceptable to all nations.  This
is why, as was  recognized in the early days of the human rights move-
ment, conditional consent is so important.  The practice mediates the
legal and aspirational  natures of human  rights treaties.  It recognizes
"  See, e.g., Henkin,  supra note 4, at 341  ("As a result of those qualifications  of its
adherence, U.S. ratification  [of the human rights treaties]  has been  described as spe-
cious, meretricious,  hypocritical.");  Paust, supra note 4, at  1257  ("Rarely has a formal
attempt at adherence to a treaty been so blatantly meaningless and so openly defiant of
its terms, the needed  efficacy of its norms, and the very possibility of its direct applica-
tion as supreme law of the land.").
2  1 See,  e.g.,  Henkin,  supra note 4, at  349  ("U.S.  ratification  practice  threatens  to
undermine a half-century of effort to establish international human rights standards as
international law."); Weissbrodt,  supra  note 4, at 78  ("By offering such an extensive and
intensive set of reservations  to  the  Covenants...  those who drafted  these  proposals
may have undermined the basic purpose  of ratifying  these treaties:  encouraging the
implementation of human rights throughout the world.").
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that nations  of the world  are  politically  and  culturally  diverse,  and
makes it possible to reach  agreement on and movement toward  gen-
eral principles of human  rights while  at the same  time accommodat-
262 ing national differences.
This mediating function has been particularly crucial for U.S. par-
ticipation  in  the  international  human  rights  movement.  Since  the
founding of the nation, many segments  of American  society have  fe-
rociously resisted international  entanglements.  Sometimes  this resis-
tance has been grounded in crass xenophobia.  Often,  however, it has
rested on more defensible grounds.  One such ground is a fundamen-
tal belief in self-government.  This belief underlies both a preference
for local decisionmaking and a general concern about the nondemoc-
ratic  and  nontransparent  ways  in  which  much  international  law  is
made.  In addition, many Americans are understandably proud of the
human rights protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Re-
construction  Amendments,  as  well  as  the vigorous  domestic judicial
system that enforces  them.  They worry that U.S. involvement  in  in-
ternational  human  rights  regimes  might  threaten  these  domestic
rights protections, in addition to the liberties guaranteed by the sepa-
ration of powers and federalism.  A final ground for resisting interna-
tional entanglements is the belief that Americans can improve the lot
of humanity  abroad not  by active  engagement  in  international  and
foreign affairs, but rather by the excellence  of its "example  [as]  a hu-
mane, democratic, and prosperous society." 6 3
Whatever  its  source  and  motivation,  U.S.  resistance  to  interna-
tional entanglements  has been an especially potent force in the twen-
tieth century, resulting in, among other things, the United States's re-
jection of the Versailles treaty, the  Bricker Amendment  debates, and
262  In  this respect,  conditional  consent is akin  to  the European  Court of Human
Rights's "margin  of appreciation"  doctrine, which  gives  deference  to national  differ-
ences  when  enforcing the  universalistic  norms of the  European  Convention  on Hu-
man Rights.  The doctrine  recognizes that in and among pluralistic democratic  socie-
ties,  there  is  reasonable  scope  for  disagreement  over  the  requirements  of broadly
worded human rights provisions.  The doctrine  thus aims to reconcile the tension be-
tween  national  democratic  decisionmaking  and universal  aspirational norms.  It also
aims to avoid damaging confrontations with national authorities, and thereby gradually
to  legitimize  international  human  rights  norms.  See  generally  HOWARD  CHARLES
YOUROW,  THE MARGIN  OF  APPRECIATION  DOCTRINE  IN THE  DYNAMICS  OF  EUROPEAN
HUMAN  RIGHTSJURISPRUDENCE  (1996).
263  H.W.  BRANDS,  WHAT  AMERICA  OWES  THE  WORLD:  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE
SOUL  OF FOREIGN  POLICY, at vii  (1998).  This  "exemplarist" approach to international
human  rights traces its lineage to  George Washington and John Quincy Adams.  Id. at
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the forty-year refusal to ratify modem human rights treaties."  Against
this  background,  the RUDs  are  an  extraordinarily  important  devel-
opment.  They helped break the logjam in domestic politics that had
prevented  U.S.  ratification  of any  of the  major  human  rights  trea-
ties.'  And,  contrary  to  conventional  wisdom  in  the human  rights
community,  they did not do so in a way that rendered human rights
commitments empty promises.  Even with the RUDs, the United States
has bound itself to almost all of the obligations in each of the four ma-
jor  human  rights  treaties  it has  ratified.  It  has  enacted  domestic
criminal,  civil, and immigration laws to implement the Genocide  and
Torture Conventions.266  Although the United States maintained that
its pre-treaty  domestic  laws satisfied  its  obligations under  the ICCPR
and  the  Race  Convention,  it legally  committed  itself not to  retreat
from  those laws.  Finally, pursuant  to the treaties,  the United  States
has  opened  its  domestic  human  rights  practices  to  official  interna-
tional scrutiny by filing with international bodies a number of reports
that describe and defend U.S. human rights practices.
In these and other ways, the United States has made genuine and
significant progress  towards  involvement in the  international  human
rights  system.  It  is  very  unlikely  that these  steps  would  have  been
taken  without  the  RUDs  as  a  condition  for U.S.  ratification.  The
United  States's  evolution  towards  participation  in international  hu-
man rights regimes has been accompanied by a consensus among U.S.
policyrnakers  concerning  the wisdom  of the  RUDs  approach.  RUDs
have had  the  support  of every  President  and  the  large  majority  of
every Senate  since  the United States began  considering  the modern
human  rights treaties in the  1970s.  This  bipartisan and interbranch
agreement is extraordinary when  considered against the backdrop  of
the  United States's  post-1950s  antagonism  towards  international  hu-
man rights law.  RUDs made this possible.
With these points in mind, we now consider the specific policy ob-
jections made against the RUDs.
B.  Message of the RUDs
One prominent criticism  of the  RUDs is that they send a message
of disrespect  for international  law in  general,  and  international  hu-
,  See  generally  KAUFMAN,  supra  note  57;  EDWARD  LUCK,  MIXED  MESSAGES:
A,\IERICAVN  POLITICS AND  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,  1919-1999, at 15-41  (1999).
See supra Part II.B.
' See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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man rights law in particular."'  As we have just reiterated, U.S. human
rights commitments  under  the treaties,  even with  the  RUDs, are  far
from  empty promises.  It is  equally  incorrect  to say  that the  RUDs
show disrespect for international law.
Consider first the  U.S. reservations,  which  decline  to  consent to
treaty provisions that violate the U.S. Constitution or that are inconsis-
tent with widely supported  criminal justice practices.  The decision by
the United States not to embrace  these relatively few provisions does
not constitute disrespect for international law.  Many nations, includ-
ing the most progressive nations in Western Europe, have  also condi-
268 tioned their consent to the treaties.  While some  nations have con-
sented to the human rights treaties without condition, there does not
appear to  be  any  correlation  between  these  nations, which  include
Libya and Iraq, and respect for international human rights law.  As Ar-
thur Rovine, a former Assistant Legal Adviser to the State Department
and current President of the American  Society of International  Law,
has noted, "It is very  easy to  sign a human  rights  treaty without any
reservations  ....  Many authoritarian  regimes have done so."2 69
The central problem for international  human  rights  law has  not
been selective consent to treaty terms, but rather the failure by nations
to adhere to the treaty terms to which they have consented.  The U.S.
RUDs are expressly designed to ensure that the United States does not
consent to an  international  obligation  that it is unable, for constitu-
tional  or political reasons,  to obey.  One can  object that the United
States has not assumed all of the obligations under the human rights
treaties, but it is wrong to conclude that the U.S. practice of declining
consent to  a small  number of human  rights obligations  shows  disre-
spect for international law.  To the contrary, it is much more plausible
to conclude that the care with which the United States crafts its con-
sent shows  respect for international  law and an  intention  to comply
with such law.
27 0
267  See Henkin,  supra note 4, at 344; see also Schabas,  supra note 4, at 283-84.  The
legal aspects of this criticism are considered above,  supra Part III.
268  See supra  Part II.B.
269  Arthur  Rovine, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in  U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES:  WITH ORWITHOUT RESERVATIONS?  57
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).
270  As Senator Moynihan explained in urging ratification of the ICCPR, the United
States "has undertaken  a meticulous examination  of U.S.  practice  to insure  that the
United States will in fact comply with the obligations that it is assuming,"  which "can
certainly be viewed as an indication of the seriousness with which  the obligations  are
regarded rather than as an expression of disdain for the obligations."  138 CONG.  REC.
S4783  (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).  Senator Moynihan  is no opponent of international  law.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
We make these points without purporting  to defend the U.S.  res-
ervations, and the practices they immunize  from international obliga-
tion, on their moral merits.  We do not contend that the reservations
can  all  be  easily defended  from  this perspective,  and,  in  any event,
such  a defense would  require  a different article.  What is important
for present purposes, however, is not our or anyone  else's views about
the moral desirability of domestic laws  enacted  in a  free and demo-
cratic process,  such  as laws  providing for capital  punishment.  What-
ever  the  moral  desirability  of the  death penalty,  the  United  States
shows no disrespect for international  law in not abolishing it, for it has
steadfastly declined to consent to any such international law, either in
a treaty or by custom.  The United States has, it is true, largely ignored
international  disapprobation  of the juvenile death  penalty  (and  the
death penalty more generally),  and it is certainly appropriate for na-
tions (not to mention U.S. citizens)  that disagree with  this practice to
criticize  the United  States.  Nothing  in  our analysis  takes  issue  with
this.  We insist only that being out of step with the rest of the world is
not, in itself,  a reason for a nation to change its domestic practices, and
it certainly does not constitute disrespect for international law.
It is also incorrect to contend that the U.S. declaration of non-self-
execution  shows  disrespect  for international  law.  Many  nations  re-
quire  implementing  legislation  before  a  treaty  has  domestic  effect,
and there is no general obligation that a nation implement a treaty in
any particular way.  Moreover, the United States is under no  obliga-
tion to change its domestic  law after ratifying a human  rights treaty if
its law already satisfies the  treaty obligations.  Under the terms of the
ICCPR, for example, nations are required to take  steps to protect the
rights under the treaty only if the rights are "not already provided  for
by existing  legislative  or other measures." 7'  The non-self-execution
declarations  therefore  can  be justified  by  the  fact  that  the  United
States already  provides sufficient  domestic  legal  protections  to fulfill
its international obligations.
This  latter proposition-that  U.S.  domestic  law satisfies  U.S.  in-
ternational human rights obligations-is open to debate.  The reason
it is  open to debate, however,  only strengthens  the case  for the non-
self-execution  declaration.  It is open to debate  because many human
rights treaty terms are couched in broad, open-ended language.  The
resulting vagueness,  combined  with  the absence  of an  authoritative
Set DANiEL PATRIcK  MOyNIHAN,  ON THE LAW  OF NATIONS  (1990)  (arguing for strong
adherence by the United States to international  law).
271 ICCPR, supra note  10, art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S at 173.
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treaty interpreter,  makes  it difficult  in  many contexts  to  determine
whether U.S.  domestic law satisfies its international obligations.
Considerjust a few of literally hundreds of possible examples from
the  ICCPR.  Can  one  say for sure  that the  absence  of proportional
representation  in the  United  States  is  consistent  with  the  ICCPR's
"right of self-determination"?
27 2  Is the  Supreme  Court's rejection  of
Lochner-style economic rights consistent with the ICCPR's guarantee of
the right "freely [to]  pursue their economic...  development"?73  Are
U.S.  campaign  finance  laws  consistent with  the  international  human
right to  "have  access,  on  general  terms  of equality,  to  public  serv-
ice"?2 74  Is  the United States's failure to prohibit some  discrimination
based on sexual orientation  consistent with its obligation  to "prohibit
any discrimination  and  guarantee  to all persons  equal  and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as... statu."'?" 75
These questions, which can proliferate almost endlessly, show how
difficult it is to tell with  certainty whether the United States is comply-
ing with all the terms of a human rights treaty.  This point sheds light
on the persistent complaints  that the United States  is in widespread
violation of the ICCPR.  One can indeed interpret the ICCPR's terms
to call into question scores  of domestic laws in the United States and
many other western  democracies.  But one can  also  easily  read  the
ICCPR obligations  as satisfied by current U.S.  domestic  law.  There is
no  authoritative  international  body  to  resolve  this  "legal"  disagree-
ment;  the ICCPR contemplates  only that nations will  open their hu-
man rights practices for other nations  to see and, if they like, to criti-
cize.  The  United  States  is  a liberal  democracy  with  extraordinary,
although  not perfect, statutory and constitutional  human rights  pro-
tections, and a federal judiciary that has historically protected  individ-
ual rights.  Its human rights protections come close enough to the line
272  Id. art. 1(1), 999 U.N.T.S.  at 173.
275  Id.
274  Id. art. 25(c),  999 U.N.T.S.  at 179.
275  Id. art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S.  at 179 (emphasis added).  The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has, in fact, interpreted the ICCPR's antidiscrimination provision to
cover  discrimination  on the  basis of sexual  orientation.  Toonen v. Australia,  U.N.
GAOR Hum. Rts.  Comm.,  49th Sess.,  Supp. No.  40, vol.  II,  at 226,  233,  U.N.  Doc.
A/49/40 (1994).  Other human rights treaties raise similar interpretive questions.  For
example, does the use by U.S.  law enforcement officials of stun belts  to restrain pris-
oners violate  the prohibition in the  Torture Convention  on "cruel, inhuman  or de-
grading treatment or punishment"?  See Torture  Convention, supra note 85,  23  I.L.M.
at 1027.  The monitoring committee  established  by the Torture  Convention recently
said yes.  Elizabeth  Olson,  U.S.  Prisoner  Restraints  Amount to Torture, Geneva Panel  Says,
N.Y. TIMEs,  May 18, 2000, at A12.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
to conclude, with justification, that it need not incur the extraordinary
costs  of litigation  and  uncertainty  that accompany  direct  incorpora-
tion of these treaty terms into its domestic litigation system.
Of course,  some  nations  have  chosen  to  incur such  costs.  The
United Kingdom, for example, is in the  process of incorporating  the
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  into  its  domestic  law, not-
withstanding  the  many  legal  uncertainties  that  this  entails.2 6  It  is
worth noting, however, that the U.S. legal system differs from the U.K.
system  in a number  of important respects.  The United  States has  a
210-year-old written constitution, including a Bill of Rights; the United
Kingdom  has no written  constitution, and  it has  been severely  criti-
cized  for its  lack  of fundamental  human  rights  protections. 277  The
United States has a long tradition ofjudicial review of national legisla-
tion;  the  United  Kingdom  does  not.  And  the United  States  has  a
deeply entrenched  federal  structure;  the United Kingdom, even  with
its recent  "devolution" of power  to Scotland and Wales,  has nothing
comparable.  In addition to these legal differences, the size,  location,
and resources of the United States are such that it may not derive  the
same benefits  as the United Kingdom  (and other European nations)
from coordinated legal regimes.
The U.S. preference for congressional, rather than judicial, moni-
toring  of the  extent  to  which  domestic  law  comports  with interna-
tional  obligations  has  an  additional justification.  Sometimes  courts
look to international bodies and the writings of scholars in giving con-
tent to international obligations.28  The ICCPR Human Rights  Com-
mittee has no official  interpretive authority over the ICCPR, but as its
recent comments on treaty reservations indicate, the Committee is not
a body that views itself as bound by consensus international  law prin-
ciples. 2'  Unfortunately, this desire to achieve  progressive  ends at the
expense  of broadly recognized international  law principles also char-
acterizes  many  academic  writings  about  international  human  rights
law.'  Since  these  sources  sometimes  influence  courts, it is  under-
standable why the treatymakers want to maintain political, as opposed
to judicial,  control  over  the  means  of implementing  the  ICCPR's
k:  Human Rights  Act, 1998,  c. 42  (Eng.);  see also Sarah Lyall,  209 Years Later, the
English Get American-Style Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A3.
277  See,  e.g.,  RONALD  DwORKIN,  A  BILL  OF  RIGHTS  FOR  BRITAIN:  WIHYF  BRITISH
LIBERTY' NEEDS PROTECrNG 1-9 (1990).
271'  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876  (2d Cir. 1980)  (relying on, among
other things, nonbinding United Nations declarations and vievs of scholars).
2  7,  See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
1.  See Simma & Alston, supra note 119.
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open-ended obligations.
We should emphasize that we are not suggesting that domestic law
perfectly protects human rights, either as written  or, especially, as en-
forced.  In the  United States,  however,  international  law is not the
principal solution to these problems.  Rather, the principal  solution is
to work within U.S. democratic and constitutional processes  to effec-
tuate  change  and improvement.  The critics  of RUDs  are  obsessed
with international  solutions to human rights problems.  This obsession
elevates  form over substance.  Sometimes  internationalization  of hu-
man rights norms-defined as the delegation of human rights respon-
sibilities  to a supranational body-can help achieve  domestic human
rights reform.  This was so in Europe, where  there was  a post-World
War II desire for human rights improvement but an absence  of confi-
dence  in domestic institutions to  achieve  those  ends." '  What works
for Europe, of course, will not necessarily work for the United States,
which has a significantly different political  culture (especially in its at-
titude  towards  international  entanglements)  and  domestic  human
rights tradition.  It was extraordinary for the United States to assent to
the general norms in the ICCPR and to  open its human  rights prac-
tices  to  official  international  scrutiny.  It does not  follow,  however,
that  human  rights progress  in  the United States  is best achieved  by
delegating the responsibility for determining the appropriate content
of human rights to bodies outside the United States.
C.  Effect of  RUDs
We now move from the meaning of RUDs to their effect on the in-
ternational human rights movement.  We have seen no empirical  evi-
dence to support the claim that RUDs undermine or threaten interna-
tional human rights law or the international human rights movement.
Rather, there  is much  evidence  to  the contrary.  The United  States
began ratifying modern human rights treaties fifteen years ago, and it
has attached  RUDs to all of the treaties.  During  this same period, in-
ternational human rights law has, by any measure, flourished.""  It is,
281 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins  of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic  Delegation
in PostwarEurope,  54 INT'L ORG. 217  (2000).
2  For  example, over  140 nations are now parties to  the  ICCPR, and  over 50 of
these nations became parties in the 1990s.  On the specific issue of the death penalty,
numerous  countries  decided  to  restrict  or abolish  capital  punishment  during  the
1990s, notwithstanding  the United  States's refusal to do so.  Amnesty  Int'l, The Death
Penalty:  List  of  Abolitionist  and  Retentionist  Countries  (Jan.  1,  2000),  http://
www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/ACT/A5000500.htm.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
of course, possible that the human rights movement would have flour-
ished  even more  in  the  absence  of U.S. RUDs.  Beyond  vague  and
conclusory platitudes, however, the critics of RUDs have not explained
how or why this is so.
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The  claim  that the U.S.  RUDs  practice  harms  the  human  rights
movement  becomes  even  less  convincing  when  one  considers  the
many ways  that  the United  States  influences human  rights  develop-
ment around the world outside the context of the human  rights trea-
ties.  The United States exerts much of its influence through  the ex-
ample  of its  own,  non-treaty-based  human  rights  standards,  which
RUDs have not diminished at all.  The United States is also the nation
that most aggressively pressures other nations to improve their human
rights standards-a practice once again not affected, at least directly,
by the RUDs.  More broadly, perhaps the greatest advance for interna-
tional human  rights was  the defeat of the Soviet Union  in  the Cold
War.  The  U.S.  RUDs  did not delay this victory.  Indeed,  one of the
initial purposes of the RUDs was to increase U.S. participation  in the
international  human  rights  community in  order  to  rebut Cold War
propaganda about U.S. human rights practices.8
These  points  indicate  another error  in  the  claim  that  the  U.S.
RUDs harm  international human rights law.  These criticisms  assume
an inappropriate  baseline of comparison.  They assume that  compared
to  U.S.  ratification without  RUDs,  RUDs  harm  international  human
rights.  This  is an  inappropriate  baseline  of comparison  because the
RUDs were clearly a pre-condition  to any U.S. ratification.8   The ap-
propriate question  is whether U.S. ratification with  RUDs  or no U.S.
ratification  at all  is better for  the international  human  rights move-
ment." X  Viewed this way, it is hard to say that the RUDs, which facili-
tate  U.S.  engagement  in  the international  human rights  movement,
harm the movement.
A related argument  is that RUDs  undermine  the United  States's
2-3  When  President  Carter  first proposed  the  RUDs  package  in  the  late  1970s,
commentators expressed concern  that the RUDs practice would induce other nations
to opt out of many of the important treaty provisions.  See, e.g., Weissbrodt, supra note
4,  at 56.  In fact, the U.S. RUDs practice has not led to any substantial increase in the
number  or breadth  of reservations  by other countries.  For  documentation  of this
point, see the record of ratifications for the treaties set forth in United Nations Treaty
Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org.
i!-4  1979 Hearings,  supra  note 80, at 21.
See supra Part 1.11 and text accompanying note 173.
SeeJack Goldsmith,  International  Human Rights Law and the United States Double
Standard,  1 GREEN  BAG 2D 365, 373 (1998).
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ability  to  influence  other  nations'  human  rights  practices.  RUDs
weaken  U.S.  credibility  on  human  rights  issues,  the argument  goes,
thereby  diminishing  the  effect  of  the  nation's  moral  pressure."'
Again,  critics  have  presented  no  empirical  evidence  to support  this
proposition.  Evidence to the contrary includes the facts that most na-
tions have not objected to the RUDs and that no nation has refused to
enter into a treaty relationship with the United States as a result of its
RUDs.  In addition, when  nations criticize U.S.  credibility on human
rights, usually in response to human rights criticisms from the United
States, they do not generally refer  to the RUDs.  Rather,  they attack
substantive  practices  such  as  discrimination,  police  abuse,  and  the
288 like, without mentioning  the  RUDs  practice.  This  focus  suggests
that U.S.  RUDs are not the currency of moral complaint, at least not
in political  debates  between  nations, as opposed to  complaints  from
human rights activists. 9
We cannot, and do not, claim that the U.S. RUDs practice has no
effect  whatsoever  on  international  affairs.  If  nothing  else,  RUDs
probably feed the suspicion in some circles that the United States is an
arrogant superpower that disdains international law.  We have tried to
show that the premise of this complaint-that  the U.S.  RUDs practice
shows  disrespect  for international  law-is  much less warranted  than
conventional wisdom suggests.  Perceptions do, however, matter in in-
ternational relations and this perception, warranted or not, might in-
fluence  the international  human  rights movement  Critics  of RUDs
have so far not demonstrated  the alleged  causes  or effects  of this in-
fluence;  nor have they shown that any realistic alternative  to the  U.S.
RUDs practice would be better for the human rights movement.
It may also  be true that  RUDs reduce  the  opportunities  for U.S.
courts to  interpret international  human  rights law and thereby  con-
287  See, e.g., Bassiouni,  supra note 4, at 1173  ("The Senate's  practice  of defacto re-
writing  treaties,  through  reservations,  declarations,  understandings,  and  provisos,
leaves  the international  credibility of the United States shaken  and its reliability as a
treaty-negotiating partner with foreign  countries in doubt."); Damrosch, supra note 4,
at 515-16  ("Regrettably,  the non-self-executing  declaration and  others of its ilk could
undermine  the efficacy  of the treaties  to  which  they apply, both  within  the  United
States and in terms of the potential for the United States to exercise  constructive influ-
ence abroad.").
288  See, e.g., Eduardo Lachica, China Criticizes American Rights Report: Beijing Responds
to U.S. Critique With a List of Stinging  Accusations, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,  2000, at 3,
available at  2000 WL-WSJA 2935375; Russia Critical  of U.S. Report on Human Rights, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS, March  1, 2000, available  atWESTLAW, All News Plus Library, DJINS
File.
289  See Goldsmith, supra  note 286, at 372.CONDITIONAL CONSENT
tribute to  the development  of such law, as  some commentators  have
complained.  This is a surprising criticism  given  that human rights
advocates frequently complain that U.S. courts interpret international
law  too  narrowly.2  In any  event, numerous  opportunities  exist  for
U.S.  officials  to interpret international  human  rights law  outside the
context  of  judicial  proceedings-for  example, in their reports  to  the
human rights committees-and these opportunities are unaffected  by
the RUDs. 22
CONCLUSION
The rise of human rights treaties has placed great demands on the
U.S. treatymaking  process.  U.S.  treatymakers face international  pres-
sures  to  ratify  human  rights treaties and participate  in international
human  rights  regimes.  Treatymakers  also  face  significant  domestic
opposition to these treaties.  Such opposition is grounded in a variety
of factors  ranging  from  concerns  about  altering  domestic  constitu-
tional lawmaking  processes,  to  general satisfaction  with  the domestic
human rights law regime, to fear of international entanglement.
RUDs  are  a  reasonable  and  largely  successful  response  to  these
competing pressures.  They have  allowed  the  United States  to make
genuine international  human rights commitments  and to participate
fully in  debates  about,  and  development  of, international  human
rights law.  RUDs also have opened up U.S. human rights practices to
official international scrutiny.  These are extraordinary advances for a
nation that has instinctively,  and sometimes vehemently, resisted  the
relinquishment of its sovereignty to international law and institutions.
At the same time, RUDs protect a range of domestic prerogatives.
L-'  See Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 67 (arguing that the non-self-execution  declara-
tions "deprive American courts of their most potent technique for contributing mean-
ingfuly to the interpretation  of the Human Rights Covenants").
I  Recent  Supreme  Court decisions  that have  been heavily criticized  by  human
rights advocates  for their interpretation  of international  law  include Breard v.  Greene,
523  U.S.  371  (1998),  Sale v. Haitian Centers Counci4 Inc.,  509  U.S.  155  (1993),  and
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.  655 (1992).
%'  Furthermore, U.S.  courts  have long applied a canon of construction  pursuant
to which federal statutes are construed, where reasonably possible, so that the statutes
do not violate international  law.  See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2  Cranch)  64, 117-18  (1804); Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separa-
tion of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International  Law, 86 GEO.  L.J.  479,  483
(1998).  In applying this canon, courts will have opportunities to construe  the human
rights treaties.  See, e.g.,  Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d  815  (9th Cir.),  cert. granted, 1221  S.  Ct.
297 (2000); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y.  1999); Mojica v. Reno, 970
F. Supp. 130  (E.D.N.Y.  1997).
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They ensure that the United States does not make international  legal
commitments  that it cannot fulfill  for domestic constitutional or po-
litical  reasons.  RUDs  leave  the  concrete  implementation  of vague
human  rights commitments  to  the federal  political  branches  rather
than the courts.  They also help preserve Congress's traditional role in
enacting domestic human rights protections, as well  as the states'  tra-
ditional role in regulating local matters.  As  we hope  to have  shown,
RUDs achieve  these ends in a manner that is consistent with both  in-
ternational law and U.S. constitutional law.
In  light of these  points,  it  might seem  surprising that  the  legal
academy and the international human rights community have been so
strongly opposed to the RUDs.  Their opposition to RUDs, however, is
simply one example  of the idealistic and perfectionist orientation  of
these groups-an  orientation  that tends  to overvalue  the role  of in-
ternational  institutions  and undervalue  domestic political  and struc-
tural  concerns.  Although  idealism  obviously  plays  a  crucial  role  in
human rights advocacy, the exaggeration and impatience  that charac-
terize the opposition to RUDs threaten  to make U.S.  officials  less in-
clined, not more inclined, to continue their involvement with interna-
tional  institutions.293  In  this  respect,  as  with  so  many  other
international  human rights issues, the perfect becomes the  enemy of
the good, and aspiration becomes the enemy of the law.
23 To take one of many examples, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee's  General
Comment 24(52)  concluded that some U.S. reservations to the ICCPR were invalid. See
supra  notes  135-36 and accompanying  text.  In response, Congress  passed a bill, later
vetoed by the President, that would have cut off funding for U.S. obligations under the
Covenant unless the Committee  "expressly recognized the validity [of U.S. RUDs]  as a
matter  of international  law."  Foreign  Relations Authorization  Act, Fiscal Years  1996
and 1997, H.R. 1561,  104th Cong. § 1504 (2d Sess. 1996).